Benghazi Clare Lopez Chuck Kubic Hillary Petraeus CIA Libya AFRICOM Judicial Watch

Lovell

Witness: US response to Benghazi attack too weak
Retired Brig. Gen. Robert Lovell

#Benghazi #ClareLopez #ChuckKubic #Hillary #Petraeus #CIA #Libya #AFRICOM #JudicialWatch

Benghazi “Clare Lopez” “Chuck Kubic” Hillary Petraeus CIA Libya AFRICOM “Judicial Watch”

Benghazi Clare Lopez Chuck Kubic Hillary Petraeus CIA Libya AFRICOM Judicial Watch

Source: http://www.scribd.com/doc/220193895/Citizens-Commission-on-Benghazi-How-America-Switched-Sides-in-the-War-on-Terror

How America Switched Sides

in the War on Terror

An Interim Report by the Citizens’
Commission On Benghazi
April 22, 2014
http://www.aim.org/benghazi
Media Contact:
Vanessa Oblinger
contact@jdcpubmail.com
2
Table of Contents
Key Takeaways 3
Summary of Findings 3
Freedom of Information Act Requests 7
Appendix (Primary Source Reporting) 22
Biographies of CCB Members 24
3
Key Takeaways:
Since its initial September 2013 conference, the Citizens’ Commission on Benghazi has
launched a months-long investigation into the causes and elements involved in the
Benghazi, Libya attacks of September 11, 2012. This research, which involves interviews
with several knowledgeable sources, has led the CCB to conclude that
• Muammar Qaddafi expressed his willingness to abdicate shortly after the
beginning of the 2011 Libyan revolt, but the U.S. ignored his calls for a truce,
which led to extensive loss of life (including four Americans), chaos, and
detrimental outcomes for U.S. national security objectives across the region.
• The U.S. facilitated the delivery of weapons and military support to al Qa’edalinked
rebels in Libya.
• On the day of the attacks in Benghazi, whether or not there was an official
order to stand down, the result was the same. There were military assets, for
example, at the U.S. base in Sigonella, in Sicily, Italy that could have been
brought to bear, and perhaps could have saved the lives of the two men killed
at the CIA Annex, the scene of the second attack that night. The failure to
attempt to rescue these Americans amounts to a dereliction of duty.
• Previous investigations have been ineffective as the cover-up of Benghazi
continues at all levels of government, prompting the need for a Select
Committee with the power of subpoena to investigate this tragedy and compel
testimony under oath outside the five-minute rule imposed on Congressional
members by the current investigative structure.
Summary of Findings:
The war in Libya was unnecessary, served no articulable U.S. national security
objective, and led to preventable chaos region-wide. In the period since the 2011
revolution in Libya, the country has remained fragmented, poorly governed, and overrun
with violent militias, the majority of which are jihadist Al Qa’eda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) affiliates. Yet, at the time of his overthrow, Muammar Qaddafi was an ally of
the United States in the Global War on Terror.
On 17 March 2011 the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1973 for a “No
Fly Zone,” ostensibly to protect Libyan civilians caught up in the hostilities between
Libyan government forces and the rebel forces, which were dominated by the Libyan
Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qa’eda. The following day in London, Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton announced U.S. government support for the Brotherhood-led Libyan
Transitional National Council in its revolt against Qaddafi.
4
The Citizens’ Commission on Benghazi (CCB) has discovered, however, that the ensuing
civil war may well have been avoided, had the U.S. chosen to permit it. Within days of
that declaration of U.S. government support for the Libyan rebels, Qaddafi sought to
enter into negotiations with the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) under a flag of truce
for the purpose of discussing his possible abdication and exile. On 21 March 2011, Rear
Admiral (ret.) Chuck Kubic began email and telephone contact between Tripoli and
AFRICOM Stuttgart regarding the possibility of talks under a white flag of truce. Over
the following days, Qaddafi expressed interest in a truce, and possible abdication and
exile out of Libya. He even pulled his forces back from several Libyan cities as a sign of
good faith.
RADM Kubic telephoned LTC Brian Linvill, the U.S. AFRICOM point of contact for all
military matters regarding the Libyan situation, to advise him of Qaddafi’s desire to enter
into military-to-military discussions. General Carter Ham was advised immediately on 21
March 2011 of these communications and conveyed them up his chain of command to the
Pentagon. After two days of back-and-forth with the Libyans, however, General Ham had
received no positive affirmation of consent from Washington, D.C. to pursue Qaddafi’s
offer. The war continued and ultimately cost tens of thousands of lives. The U.S. failure
to even consider Qaddafi’s request for talks, and its determination to enter and pursue this
war in support of al-Qa’eda-linked rebels, presents the appearance of a policy intent upon
empowering Islamic forces with no measurable benefit to U.S. national security.
Changing sides in the War on Terror: Even more disturbingly, the U.S. was fully
aware of and facilitating the delivery of weapons to the al-Qa’eda-dominated rebel
militias throughout the 2011 rebellion. The jihadist agenda of AQIM, the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG), and other Islamic terror groups represented among the rebel
forces was well known to U.S. officials responsible for Libya policy. The rebels made no
secret of their al-Qa’eda affiliation, openly flying and speaking in front of the black flag
of Islamic jihad, according to author John Rosenthal and multiple media reports. And yet,
the White House and senior Congressional members deliberately and knowingly pursued
a policy that provided material support to terrorist organizations in order to topple a ruler
who had been working closely with the West actively to suppress al-Qa’eda. The result in
Libya, across much of North Africa, and beyond has been utter chaos, disruption of
Libya’s oil industry, the spread of dangerous weapons (including surface-to-air missiles),
and the empowerment of jihadist organizations like al-Qa’eda and the Muslim
Brotherhood.
The Weapons Flow: An American citizen source trusted by the CCB who has long
experience in the Middle East described the flow of weapons from Qatar to the Libyan
rebels and the diversion of some of those arms. After Qaddafi’s regime had been ousted,
5
a delegation from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) traveled to Libya to collect payment
for the weapons the UAE had financed and Qatar had delivered to the Transitional
National Council (TNC) during the war. The UAE delegation was seeking $1 billion it
claimed was owed. During their visit to Tripoli, the UAE officials discovered that half of
the $1 billion worth of weapons it had financed for the rebels had, in fact, been diverted
by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the Muslim Brotherhood head of the Libyan TNC, and sold to
Qaddafi. Furthermore, according to information learned during the UAE visit to Tripoli,
when Jalil learned that Major General Abdel Fatah Younis, Qaddafi’s former Minister of
the Interior before his late February 2011 defection to the rebel forces, had found out
about the weapons diversion, he ordered Abu Salim Abu Khattala, leader of the Abu
Obeida Bin al-Jarrah brigade to kill him. Abu Khattala, later identified as the Ansar al-
Shariah commander who led the 11 September 2012 attack on the U.S. mission in
Benghazi, accepted the orders and directed the killing of Gen. Younis in July 2011.
The key significance of this episode is the demonstration of a military chain-of-command
relationship between the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood leadership of the TNC and the al-
Qa’eda-affiliated militia (Ansar al-Shariah) that has been named responsible for the
attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi. Abu Khattala is under a Department of Justice
sealed indictment. His brigade merged into Ansar al-Shariah in 2012, and he was
positively identified to the FBI in a cell-phone photo from the scene of the attack, yet
remains free and available for interviews to the media.
The White House Cover-Up: Despite the several ongoing Congressional investigations,
as well as the State Department’s Accountability Review Board (ARB) report, the
American people are no closer to knowing exactly what happened in Benghazi and why
than they were on 12 September 2012. The Congressional committees have pursued their
work in closed-door sessions as well as open testimony, but in a disjointed and
uncoordinated fashion that has been stymied by administration stonewalling and the fiveminute
rule that severely curtails members’ ability to pursue a full and fair investigation.
CCB members have signed two letters to Speaker John Boehner demanding the creation
of a Select Committee to address these problems.
The CCB conducted an extensive research effort into the elements and sequence of the
administration’s two-week campaign to falsely claim that a protest had preceded the
attack on our Benghazi mission, and their efforts to blame a YouTube video for the
attack. The White House campaign appears to have been well-coordinated with U.S.
Muslim Brotherhood organizations as well as Islamic state members of the Organization
of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), who all joined in condemnation of the video, and, even
more troubling, issued calls for restrictions on Americans’ free speech rights.
6
The FOIA Investigation: We have also begun our own investigation into the events
surrounding September 11, 2012 through the use of the Freedom of Information Act
request process. To date, Accuracy in Media and the CCB Members have filed 85 FOIA
requests to the Department of State, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency
and Federal Bureau of Investigation. These requests can be seen at
http://www.aim.org/benghazi/freedom-of-information-act-requests/. Major questions
asked include requests to produce:
• [The] September 15th or 16th FBI 302 Interview Reports, and corresponding
handwritten notes, of interviews conducted in Germany of United States
personnel who had been in the Benghazi mission and the Benghazi CIA annex
during the September 11th and 12th attacks on those facilities.
• Any and all videos depicting the United States Consulate in Benghazi, Libya
(including the Special Mission Compound and the Annex) between September
10, 2012 and September 12, 2012. This request includes, but is not limited to
(1) all videos and photographs obtained, transmitted, or recorded via any
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and (2) video of closed-circuit television
monitor at the Benghazi Mission facility’s Tactical Operations Center on
September 11th and 12th, 2013.
• All records generated between September 11, 2012 and the present, by
survivors of the September 11th and 12th attacks on the Benghazi mission and
the Benghazi CIA Annex, or by any person regarding the survivors’ accounts
of the attack.
• Non-Disclosure Agreements signed by survivors of the Benghazi attacks,
including employees or contractors of the CIA or DOD.
7
The CCB Freedom of Information Act Investigation
The disjointed investigations by multiple House committees into the events of September
11, 2012 have yielded few new details regarding what occurred during the attack on the
U.S. Mission and CIA Annex in Benghazi, Libya. What details have been uncovered are
colored by partisanship due to the contentious nature of the two-party process. To
uncover the truth about what happened that night, we have submitted 85 Freedom of
Information Act requests to a variety of government agencies and departments.
Accuracy in Media, in conjunction with the CCB, has issued Freedom of Information
requests to the Department of Defense, State Department, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and Central Intelligence Agency.
Requests
to
the
Army
Request.
This
FOIA
request
is
for
disclosure
of
records
regarding
the
attack
on
US
facilities
in
Benghazi,
Libya,
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012.
Specifically,
we
seek
production
of:
Croatia.
Records
regarding
the
readiness
status
of,
and
orders
given
to,
airborne
special
operations
unit,
“Commanders
In-­‐extremis
Force”
(“CIF”),
assigned
to
the
European
Command,
and
in
Croatia,
including:
(a)
Orders
for
the
CIF
to
deploy
to
NAS
Sigonella;
and
(b)
All
communications
from
the
CIF
notifying
command
that
it
was
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
that
aircraft
was
airborne,
bound
for
NAS
Sigonella,
and,
if
applicable,
orders
to
abort
or
turn
back.
Requests
to
the
Navy
Requests.
These
FOIA
requests
are
for
disclosure
of
records
regarding
the
attack
on
US
facilities
in
Benghazi,
Libya,
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012.
Specifically,
we
seek
production
of:
1.
Sigonella.
Records
identifying,
and
concerning,
all
US
aircraft
at
NATO
Base
Sigonella,
Naval
Air
Station
Sigonella
in
Sicily,
Italy
(“NAS
Sigonella”),
whether
transport,
cargo,
refueling,
fighter,
attack,
or
surveillance.
Records
should
include
those
that
disclose
the
readiness
status
of:

Any
F-­‐16
and
F-­‐18
fighters
(a/k/a
F/A-­‐18

Fighter/Attack);

C-­‐5,
C-­‐9,
C-­‐17,
C-­‐40
and
C-­‐130
transport;
● C-­‐2
cargo;
C-­‐26
passenger/cargo;

KC-­‐10
and
KC-­‐135
refueling;
and

P-­‐3
surveillance.
2.
Records
disclosing
the
readiness
status
of
the
130-­‐man
Marine
Force
Reconnaissance
Team
at
NAS
Sigonella,
including:
(a)
All
communications
with,
and
orders
to,
NAS
Sigonella
personnel
to
get
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
to
deploy,
to
Benghazi;
and
(b)
All
communications
from
NAS
Sigonella
personnel
notifying
8
command
that
assets
were
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
that
aircraft
was
airborne,
bound
for
Benghazi,
and,
if
applicable,
orders
to
abort
or
turn
back.
3.
Rota.
Records
revealing
the
status
of
two
Marine
Corps
“Fleet
Antiterrorism
Security
Teams
(“FAST”),
at
the
Spanish
naval
base
Naval
Station
Rota
(“NAVSTA
Rota”),
including:
(a)
All
communications
with,
and
orders
to,
NAVSTA
Rota
personnel
to
get
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
to
deploy;
and
(b)
All
communications
from
NAVSTA
Rota
personnel
notifying
command
that
assets
were
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
that
aircraft
was
airborne,
bound
for
Benghazi,
and,
if
applicable,
orders
to
abort
or
turn
back.
4.
Military
assets
pre-­‐positioned
in
October
2011.
In
addition
to
records
regarding
the
attack
on
US
facilities
in
Benghazi,
Libya,
on
September
11th
and
12th,
we
also
seek
records
identifying
DoD
assets
pre-­‐positioned
off
the
coast
of
Tripoli
on
October
18,
2011,
when
Secretary
Clinton
visited
Libya.
Requests
to
the
Air
Force
Requests.
These
FOIA
requests
are
for
disclosure
of
records
regarding
the
attack
on
US
facilities
in
Benghazi,
Libya,
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012.
Specifically,
we
seek
production
of:
1.
Sigonella.
Records
identifying,
and
concerning,
all
US
aircraft
at
NATO
Base
Sigonella,
Naval
Air
Station
Sigonella
in
Sicily,
Italy
(“NAS
Sigonella”),
whether
transport,
cargo,
refueling,
fighter,
attack,
or
surveillance.
Records
should
include
those
that
disclose
the
readiness
status
of:

Any
F-­‐16
and
F-­‐18
fighters
(a/k/a
F/A-­‐18

Fighter/Attack);

C-­‐5,
C-­‐9,
C-­‐17,
C-­‐40
and
C-­‐130
transport;

C-­‐2
cargo;
C-­‐26
passenger/cargo;

KC-­‐10
and
KC-­‐135
refueling;
and

P-­‐3
surveillance.
2.
Records
disclosing
the
readiness
status
of
the
130-­‐man
Marine
Force
Reconnaissance
Team
at
NAS
Sigonella,
including:
(a)
All
communications
with,
and
orders
to,
NAS
Sigonella
personnel
to
get
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
to
deploy;
and
(b)
All
communications
from
NAS
Sigonella
personnel
notifying
command
that
assets
were
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
that
aircraft
was
airborne,
bound
for
Benghazi,
and,
if
applicable,
orders
to
abort
or
turn
back.
3.
“Feet
dry
over
Libya”
radio
transmission.
Any
record
of
transmission
from
any
aircraft
during
the
crisis
that
stated,
“Feet
dry
over
Libya,”
or
words
to
that
effect,
informing
that
aircraft
was
transitioning
from
above
the
Mediterranean
Sea
to
above
the
Libyan
landmass.
Additional
Requests
to
the
Air
Force
9
FOIA
Request.
The
requesters
seek
disclosure
of
records
identifying
all
US
aircraft
at
Aviano
Air
Base
in
northeastern
Italy
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012,
including
all
U.S.
Air
Force
31st
Fighter
Wing
assets,
whether
transport,
cargo,
refueling,
fighter,
attack,
or
surveillance.
Requests
to
the
Marines
Requests.
These
FOIA
requests
are
for
disclosure
of
records
regarding
the
attack
on
US
facilities
in
Benghazi,
Libya,
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012.
Specifically,
we
seek
production
of:
1.
Sigonella.
Records
disclosing
the
readiness
status
of
the
130-­‐man
Marine
Force
Reconnaissance
Team
at
NAS
Sigonella,
including:
(a)
All
communications
with,
and
orders
to,
NAS
Sigonella
personnel
to
get
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
to
deploy,
to
Benghazi;
and
(b)
All
communications
from
NAS
Sigonella
personnel
notifying
command
that
assets
were
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
that
aircraft
was
airborne,
bound
for
Benghazi,
and,
if
applicable,
orders
to
abort
or
turn
back.
2.
Any
records
of
the
Department
of
Defense
seeking
help
by
use
of
Italian
aircraft
at
NAS
Sigonella.
3.
Rota.
Records
revealing
the
status
of
two
Marine
Corps
“Fleet
Antiterrorism
Security
Teams
(“FAST”),
at
the
Spanish
naval
base
Naval
Station
Rota
(“NAVSTA
Rota”),
including:
(a)
All
communications
with,
and
orders
to,
NAVSTA
Rota
personnel
to
get
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
to
deploy;
and
(b)
All
communications
from
NAVSTA
Rota
personnel
notifying
command
that
assets
were
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
that
aircraft
was
airborne,
and,
if
applicable,
orders
to
abort
or
turn
back.
Requests
to
HQ
USEUCOM
(U.S.
European
Command)
Requests.
These
FOIA
requests
are
for
disclosure
of
records
regarding
the
attack
on
US
facilities
in
Benghazi,
Libya,
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012.
Specifically,
we
seek
production
of:
1.
Sigonella.
Records
identifying,
and
concerning,
all
US
aircraft
at
NATO
Base
Sigonella,
Naval
Air
Station
Sigonella
in
Sicily,
Italy
(“NAS
Sigonella”),
whether
transport,
cargo,
refueling,
fighter,
attack,
or
surveillance.
Records
should
include
those
that
disclose
the
readiness
status
of:

Any
F-­‐16
and
F-­‐18
fighters
(a/k/a
F/A-­‐18

Fighter/Attack);

C-­‐5,
C-­‐9,
C-­‐17,
C-­‐40
and
C-­‐130
transport;

C-­‐2
cargo;
C-­‐26
passenger/cargo;

KC-­‐10
and
KC-­‐135
refueling;
and

P-­‐3
surveillance.
2.
Records
disclosing
the
readiness
status
of
the
130-­‐man
Marine
Force
Reconnaissance
Team
at
NAS
Sigonella,
including:
(a)
All
communications
with,
and
orders
to,
NAS
Sigonella
personnel
to
get
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
to
deploy,
to
Benghazi;
and
(b)
All
communications
from
NAS
Sigonella
personnel
notifying
10
command
that
assets
were
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
that
aircraft
was
airborne,
bound
for
Benghazi,
and,
if
applicable,
orders
to
abort
or
turn
back.
3.
Any
records
of
the
Department
of
Defense
seeking
help
by
use
of
Italian
aircraft
at
NAS
Sigonella.
4.
Rota.
Records
revealing
the
status
of
two
Marine
Corps
Fleet
Antiterrorism
Security
Teams
(“FAST”),
at
the
Spanish
naval
base
Naval
Station
Rota
(“NAVSTA
Rota”),
including:
(a)
All
communications
with,
and
orders
to,
NAVSTA
Rota
personnel
to
get
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
to
deploy;
and
(b)
All
communications
from
NAVSTA
Rota
personnel
notifying
command
that
assets
were
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
that
aircraft
was
airborne,
and,
if
applicable,
orders
to
abort
or
turn
back.
5.
Croatia.
Records
regarding
the
readiness
status
of,
and
orders
given
to,
airborne
special
operations
unit,
“Commanders
In-­‐extremis
Force”
(“CIF”),
assigned
to
the
European
Command,
and
in
Croatia,
including:
(a)
Orders
for
the
CIF
to
deploy
to
NAS
Sigonella;
and
(b)
All
communications
from
the
CIF
notifying
command
that
it
was
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
that
aircraft
was
airborne,
bound
for
NAS
Sigonella,
and,
if
applicable,
orders
to
abort
or
turn
back.
6.
Maps.
Maps
depicting
all
assets
that
could
have
been
dispatched
to
the
Benghazi
mission
or
the
CIA
annex
facility
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012,
regardless
of
such
maps
were
created
before
or
after
September
11,
2012.
Requests
to
United
States
Central
Command
This
FOIA
request
is
for
disclosure
of
records
regarding
the
attack
on
US
facilities
in
Benghazi,
Libya,
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012.
Specifically,
we
seek
production
of:
Maps
depicting
all
assets
that
could
have
been
dispatched
to
the
Benghazi
mission
or
the
CIA
annex
facility
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012,
regardless
of
such
maps
were
created
before
or
after
September
11,
2012.
Requests
to
HQ
U.S.
AFRICOM
(U.S.
Africa
Command)
Requests.
These
FOIA
requests
are
for
disclosure
of
records
regarding
the
attack
on
US
facilities
in
Benghazi,
Libya,
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012.
Specifically,
we
seek
production
of:
1.
AFRICOM
communications.
All
records
of
AFRICOM
Joint
Operations
Center
(JOC)
Chief’s
communications
subsequent
to
that
Officer’s
receipt
of
messages
emanating
from
the
Compound’s
TOC.
This
request
is
to
be
read
to
include
all
communications
to
all
US
personnel,
whether
armed
forces
or
civilians,
and
includes
communications
to
General
Carter
Ham,
the
Unified
Combatant
Command,
the
Pentagon,
CIA,
Department
of
State,
and
White
House
including
the
Situation
Room.
2.
Appeals
for
help.
Records
of
requests
for
help
for
personnel
at
the
Special
Mission
Compound
and
the
CIA
Annex,
to:
(a)
The
Turkish
Consulate
in
Benghazi;
11
(b)
The
Italian
Consulate
in
Benghazi;
and
(c)
The
U.K.
Security
Team.
3.
Maps.
Maps
depicting
all
assets
that
could
have
been
dispatched
to
the
Benghazi
mission
or
the
CIA
annex
facility
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012,
regardless
of
such
maps
were
created
before
or
after
September
11,
2012.
4.
Audio.
All
records
of
radio
communications
emanating
from
the
Compound’s
Tactical
Operations
Center
(TOC),
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012,
whether
made
by
Regional
Security
Officer
(RSO)
Alec
Henderson
or
any
other
person.
5.
“Feet
dry
over
Libya”
radio
transmission.
Any
record
of
transmission
from
any
aircraft
during
the
crisis
that
stated,
“Feet
dry
over
Libya,”
or
words
to
that
effect,
informing
that
aircraft
was
transitioning
from
above
the
Mediterranean
Sea
to
above
the
Libyan
landmass.
6.
Military
assets
pre-­‐positioned
in
October
2011.
In
addition
to
records
regarding
the
attack
on
US
facilities
in
Benghazi,
Libya,
on
September
11th
and
12th,
we
also
seek
records
identifying
DoD
assets
pre-­‐positioned
off
the
coast
of
Tripoli
on
October
18,
2011,
when
Secretary
Clinton
visited
Libya.
Requests
to
HQ
USSOCOM
(Special
Operations
Command)
Requests.
These
FOIA
requests
are
for
disclosure
of
records
regarding
the
attack
on
US
facilities
in
Benghazi,
Libya,
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012.
Specifically,
we
seek
production
of:
1.
Rota.
Records
revealing
the
status
of
two
Marine
Corps
Fleet
Antiterrorism
Security
Teams
(“FAST”),
at
the
Spanish
naval
base
Naval
Station
Rota
(“NAVSTA
Rota”),
including:
(a)
All
communications
with,
and
orders
to,
NAVSTA
Rota
personnel
to
get
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
to
deploy,
to
Benghazi;
and
(b)
All
communications
from
NAVSTA
Rota
personnel
notifying
command
that
assets
were
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
that
aircraft
was
airborne,
bound
for
Benghazi,
and,
if
applicable,
orders
to
abort
or
turn
back.
2.
Croatia.
Records
regarding
the
readiness
status
of,
and
orders
given
to,
airborne
special
operations
unit,
“Commanders
In-­‐extremis
Force”
(“CIF”),
assigned
to
the
European
Command,
and
in
Croatia,
including:
(a)
Orders
for
the
CIF
to
deploy
to
NAS
Sigonella;
and
(b)
All
communications
from
the
CIF
notifying
command
that
it
was
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
that
aircraft
was
airborne,
bound
for
NAS
Sigonella,
and,
if
applicable,
orders
to
abort
or
turn
back.
3.
United
States.
Records
disclosing
the
readiness
status
of,
and
orders
given
to,
Special
Operations
Forces
(“Special
Ops”
or
“SOF”)
in
the
United
States,
including:
(a)
Orders
for
Special
Ops
to
deploy
to
Libya;
and
(b)
Communications
from
SOF
notifying
command
that
it
was
ready
to
deploy,
and,
if
applicable,
that
aircraft
was
airborne,
bound
for
Libya,
and,
if
applicable,
orders
to
abort
or
turn
back.
12
4.
“Feet
dry
over
Libya”
radio
transmission.
Any
record
of
transmission
from
any
aircraft
during
the
crisis
that
stated,
“Feet
dry
over
Libya,”
or
words
to
that
effect,
informing
that
aircraft
was
transitioning
from
above
the
Mediterranean
Sea
to
above
the
Libyan
landmass.
Requests
to
OSD/JS
(Office
of
the
Secretary
of
Defense
and
the
Joint
Staff)
Requests.
FOIA
request
Nos.
1,
2
and
3
are
for
disclosure
of
records
regarding
the
attack
on
US
facilities
in
Benghazi,
Libya,
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012.
Specifically,
we
seek
production
of:
1.
Maps.
Maps
depicting
all
assets
that
could
have
been
dispatched
to
the
Benghazi
mission
or
the
CIA
annex
facility
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012,
regardless
of
such
maps
were
created
before
or
after
September
11,
2012.
2.
Appeals
for
help.
Records
of
requests
for
help
for
the
Special
Mission
Compound
and
the
CIA
Annex,
to:
(a)
The
Turkish
Consulate
in
Benghazi;
(b)
The
Italian
Consulate
in
Benghazi;
and
(c)
The
U.K.
Security
Team.
3.
Records
concerning
joint
military
contingency
plans:
(a)
Plan
Identification
(PID)
Number
and
title
of
the
operation
plan
or
plans
prepared
using
Deliberate
Planning
procedures,
found
in
Joint
Publication
5-­‐0,
Joint
Operation
Plan,
August
2011,
for
use
by
the
supported
combatant
commander
(1)
to
support
military,
diplomatic
and
interagency
activities
in
Libya,
through
2012,
and
(2)
to
support
the
military
crisis
response
to
the
attacks
on
the
Benghazi
facilities
on
September
11
and
12,
2012.
(b)
Operation
plan
or
plans
for
use
by
the
supported
combatant
commander
to
support
military
crisis
response
to
the
attacks
on
the
Benghazi
facilities
on
September
11
and
12,
2012.
(c)
List
of
commands,
organizations
and
agencies
comprising
the
joint
planning
and
execution
community
(JPEC),
found
in
Joint
Publication
5-­‐0,
Joint
Operation
Plan,
August
2011,
which
developed,
coordinated,
and
approved
the
operation
plans
referred
to
under
(a)
above.
(d)
Supported
combatant
commander’s
Joint
Intelligence
Preparation
of
the
Operational
Environment
(JIPOE),
developed
to
support
the
plans
referenced
under
(a)
above.
(e)
List
of
commands,
organizations,
agencies
and
offices
comprising
the
supported
combatant
commander’s
joint
interagency
coordinating
group
(JIACG),
established
to
support
the
plans
referenced
under
(a)
above.
(f)
Copies
of
any
combatant
command
commercial
contracts
established
to
support
military,
diplomatic
and
interagency
activities
at
Tripoli
and
at
Benghazi
prior
to
the
attacks
on
the
Benghazi
facilities
on
September
11
and
12,
2012.
4.
Military
assets
pre-­‐positioned
in
October
2011.
In
addition
to
records
regarding
the
attack
on
US
facilities
in
Benghazi,
Libya,
on
September
11th
and
12th,
we
also
seek
records
identifying
DoD
assets
pre-­‐positioned
off
the
coast
of
Tripoli
on
October
18,
2011,
when
Secretary
Clinton
visited
Libya.
13
Requests
to
the
Defense
Intelligence
Agency
1.
Maps.
Maps
depicting
all
assets
within
fifteen
hundred
miles
of
Benghazi,
Libya,
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012,
regardless
of
such
maps
were
created
before
or
after
September
11,
2012.
2.
Military
assets
pre-­‐positioned
in
October
2011.
Records
of
all
Defense
Department
assets
that
were
pre-­‐positioned
off
the
coast
of
Tripoli
on
October
18,
2011,
when
Secretary
Clinton
visited
Libya.
3.
Terrorist
threat
in
2012.
For
the
calendar
year
2012,
records
of
the
threat
to
U.S.
personnel
because
of
al-­‐Qaida
or
Ansar
al-­‐Shariah
or
other
belligerent
build-­‐up
in
Benghazi,
including
photographs.
Requests
to
the
State
Department
FOIA Requests. These requests are for the following records of activities in Libya, in the care,
custody or control of the State Department, regardless of the source of the records:
1. All records of whatsoever nature regarding (1) the Benghazi consulate and
(2) its CIA Annex, for the time period of January 1st, 2011, through September 30th,
2012. This request is all-inclusive for all records, however recorded, including emails,
reports, memoranda, correspondence, teletypes, telephone calls, text messages, and audio
and video recordings, regarding all uses of the Benghazi consulate and CIA
Annex. Responsive records include those that disclose:
(1) The comings and goings of all persons, whether civilian, military,
American or foreign, including any non-US personnel questioned, interrogated,
detained, or transported through, the CIA Annex and Benghazi consulate;
(2) The descriptions and inventories of all weapons brought into the
Annex;
(3) The sources of all such weapons;
(4) The descriptions and inventories of all weapons removed from the
Annex,
(5) The intended destinations and recipients of all such weaponry,
including
(i) All transfers of arms and equipment to Libyan resistance
fighters, both before or after the United Nations recognized
the National Transitional Council as the legal
representative of Libya;
(ii) Transportation of arms and equipment from Libya into
Turkey; and
(iii) US Government supply of weapons into Syria.
(6) All communication and cryptographic equipment at the CIA
Annex and Benghazi consulate;
(7) The weaponry, communication, and cryptographic equipment, that
may have been left in the Annex and Benghazi consulate when US personnel
abandoned these facilities on September 11th and 12th, 2012;
(8) Information about the weapons recovered from fallen attackers at
the Ambassador’s compound as well as the CIA Annex during and after the
attacks;
14
(9) Information about the identities and affiliations of any of those
fallen fighters as well as the disposition of their bodies, alive or
dead; and
(10) CIA situation reports, or “sitreps,” sent, including on September
11th, 12th, and 13th.
2.
Any
and
all
videos
depicting
the
United
States
Consulate
in
Benghazi,
Libya
(including
the
Special
Mission
Compound
and
the
Annex)
between
September
10,
2012
and
September
12,
2012.
This
request
includes,
but
is
not
limited
to
(1)
all
videos
and
photographs
obtained,
transmitted,
or
recorded
via
any
unmanned
aerial
vehicles
(UAVs),
and
(2)
video
of
closed-­‐circuit
television
monitor
at
the
Benghazi
Mission
facility’s
Tactical
Operations
Center
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2013.
3.
All
records
generated
between
September
11,
2012
and
the
present,
by
survivors
of
the
September
11th
and
12th
attacks
on
the
Benghazi
mission
and
the
Benghazi
CIA
Annex,
or
by
any
person
regarding
the
survivors’
accounts
of
the
attack.
4.
All
records
of
radio
communications
emanating
from
the
Compound’s
Tactical
Operations
Center
(TOC),
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012,
whether
made
by
Regional
Security
Officer
(RSO)
Alec
Henderson
or
any
other
person.
5.
All
records
of
Secretary
Panetta’s
actions
and
communications
for
the
24-­‐
hour
period
beginning
when
first
notified
that
the
Benghazi
Consulate
was
under
attack.
Responsive
records
include:
(1)
All
records
generated
by
Secretary
Panetta,
including
all
emails,
memoranda,
or
notes;
(2)
Telephone
logs
or
bills
or
other
statements
of
all
of
his
telephone
calls
placed
or
received;
and
(3)
All
records
generated
by
anyone
about
the
Secretary’s
actions
and
communications
6.
All
records
of
Secretary
Clinton’s
actions
and
communications
for
the
24-­‐
hour
period
beginning
when
first
notified
that
the
Benghazi
Consulate
was
under
attack.
Responsive
records
include:
(1)
All
records
generated
by
Secretary
Clinton,
including
all
emails,
memoranda,
or
notes;
(2)
Telephone
logs
or
bills
or
other
statements
of
all
of
her
telephone
calls
placed
or
received;
and
(3)
All
records
generated
by
anyone
about
the
Secretary’s
actions
and
communications.
7.
Any
records
reflecting
the
time,
and
substance,
of
the
President’s
first
notification
that
the
Benghazi
Consulate
was
under
attack,
and
his
actions,
and
communications,
for
the
next
24
hours.
8.
All
calendars,
day
books,
journals,
notes,
memoranda,
or
other
records
reflecting
Ambassador
Stevens’
schedule
on
September
11,
2012,
including
the
Ambassador’s
diary,
and
all
correspondence
to
or
from
the
Ambassador
regarding
his
meetings
that
day,
including
with
the
Turkish
Consul
General.
9.
All
records
of
the
purpose
of
Ambassador
Stevens’
meetings
on
September
11,
2012,
including
analysis
or
assessments
of
those
meetings,
whether
written
before
or
after
September
11,
2012.
15
10.
All
correspondence
to
or
from
Ambassador
Stevens
on
September
10th
and
11th,
2012.
11.
All
notes,
memoranda,
and
correspondence
generated
between
January
of
2007
and
September
11,
2012,
regarding
meetings
between
Christopher
Stevens
or
any
other
Tripoli
Embassy
official,
and
one
or
more
of
the
following
individuals:

Ahmed
Abu
Khattala,
a
commander
of
the
Libyan
Ansar
al-­‐
Shariah
militia
group

Mustafa
Abdul
Jalil,
Chairman
of
the
Libyan
National
Transitional
Council
from
5
March
2011-­‐8
August
2012

Mahmoud
Jibril,
Interim
Prime
Minister
of
Libya
and
Chair
of
the
Executive
Board
of
the
National
Transitional
Council
from
5\
March-­‐23
October
2011

Wissam
bin
Hamid,
a
Libya
Shield
Brigade
commander,
supporter
of
the
Libyan
Muslim
Brotherhood
Justice
&
Construction
Party,
and
veteran
jihad
fighter
of
Iraq
&
Afghanistan,
who
provided
security
for
US
representatives
in
Benghazi
and
was
tentatively
identified
by
the
Library
of
Congress
as
the
head
of
al-­‐Qa’eda
in
Libya

Abdelhakim
Belhadj
(aka
Abdallah
al
Sadeq),
veteran
jihad
fighter
of
Iraq
&
Afghanistan,
commander
of
the
AQ
franchise
militia,
Libyan
Islamic
Fighting
Group
(LIFG)
(aka
Libyan
Islamic
Movement
for
Change),
post-­‐revolution
military
commander
of
Tripoli,
and
Libyan
delegation
leader
to
the
Syrian
Free
Army
in
late
2011

Ismael
al-­‐Sallabi
(brother
of
Ali),
commander
of
the
Al-­‐Qa’eda-­‐
linked
al-­‐Sahati
Brigade
during
the
revolution,
and
Benghazi
Military
Council
commander
afterwards,
close
ally
of
Abdelhakim
Belhadj
and
Mustafa
Jalil

Ali
al-­‐Sallabi
(brother
of
Ismael),
called
the
‘spiritual
leader’
of
the
Libyan
revolution,
Muslim
Brotherhood
links,
led
effort
with
Seif
al-­‐Qaddafi
and
US
Embassy
Tripoli
to
gain
release
of
jihadi
detainees
from
Libyan
jails

Mohammad
al-­‐Sallabi,
father
of
Ali
and
Ismael,
among
the
founders
of
the
Libyan
Muslim
Brotherhood
in
the
1960s

Abu
Sufian
bin
Qumu,
veteran
jihad
fighter
in
Afghanistan
from
Derna,
Libya,
captured
in
2001,
detained
at
GITMO,
sent
back
to
Libyan
jail,
released
in
2010,
led
jihad
vs
Qaddafi
in
2011,
and
led
Benghazi
Mission
attack
in
Sep
2012.
12.
For
the
period
of
February
15th,
2011,
through
December
31st,
2012,
all
DOD
and
CIA
or
other
intelligence
community
records,
shared
with
members
of
Congress,
regarding
collection,
storage,
transportation
of
arms
and
equipment
in
Libya.
13.
For
the
period
of
February
15th,
2011,
through
December
31st,
2012,
all
DOD
and
CIA
or
other
intelligence
community
records
of
Congressional
approval
for
CIA
transport
of
arms
to
Syrian
rebel
forces.
14.
All
records
regarding
Deputy
National
Security
Adviser
for
Homeland
Security
and
Counter-­‐terrorism
John
Brennan’s
recommendations
regarding
the
overthrow
of
Libyan
leader
Muammar
Gaddafi.
15.
Records
of
the
names,
and
titles,
of
individuals
indentified
only
as
“Senior
16
State
Department
Official
Number
One”
and
“Senior
State
Department
Official
Number
Two”
during
the
October
9,
2012,
Background
Briefing
on
Libya,
given
by
the
Office
of
the
Spokesperson,
the
transcript
of
which
was
publicly
disclosed,
titled,
“Background
Conference
Call
With
Senior
State
Department
Officials.”
Additional
Requests
to
the
State
Department
1.
Records
generated
from
August
2009,
through
October
of
2011,
regarding
Secretary
of
State
Clinton’s
recommendations
regarding
U.S.
support
to
those
seeking
to
oust
forces
loyal
to
Colonel
Muammar
Gaddafi
and
his
government.
2.
Records
generated
from
March
of
2011
through
September
of
2012,
regarding
Secretary
of
State
Clinton’s
recommendations
to
support
those
seeking
to
oust
forces
loyal
to
the
government
of
Bashar
al-­‐Assad.
3.
Records
of
communications
sent
from,
received
by,
or
routed
through,
Secretary
Clinton’s
office
regarding
the
need
for
a
‘permanent
constituent
post”
in
Benghazi,
as
well
as
records
regarding
Secretary
of
State
Clinton’s
decision
to
continue
operations
in
Benghazi,
including
the
extent
to
which
the
Benghazi
Mission
in
any
way
facilitated
the
existence
and
operations
of
the
CIA
Annex.
4.
Records
indentifying
DoD
assets
pre-­‐positioned
off
the
coast
of
Tripoli
when
Secretary
Clinton
visited
Libya
in
October
of
2011.
5.
Records
generated
from
Secretary
Clinton’s
September
11th
and
12th,
2012
requests
for
help
for
personnel
at
the
Special
Mission
Compound
and
the
CIA
Annex,
to:
(a)
The
Libyan
government;
(b)
The
Turkish
Consulate
in
Benghazi;
(c)
The
Italian
Consulate
in
Benghazi;
and
(d)
The
U.K.
Security
Team.
Requests
to
the
FBI
1.
All
records
describing
or
defining
the
purpose,
scope,
jurisdiction,
and
power
of
the
FBI’s
investigation
into
the
Benghazi
attacks,
including
the
identity
of
government
official(s)
requesting
or
ordering
the
probe.
2.
All
records
of
the
Bureau’s
findings
in
its
investigation
into
the
Benghazi
attacks.
Responsive
records
include
those
that
regard
(1)
the
identities
of
any
non-­‐US
personnel
questioned,
interrogated,
detained,
or
transported
through,
the
Annex,
(2)
weapons
brought
into,
and
removed
from,
the
Annex,
as
well
as
such
weaponry’s
destinations
including
whether
abandoned
on
September
12,
2012,
(3)
communication
and
cryptographic
equipment
left
in
the
Consulate
and
Annex
when
US
personnel
abandoned
the
facilities
on
September
12,
2012,
and
(4)
any
probe
into
the
meetings
from
January
2007
through
September
2012
between
Tripoli
Embassy
officials,
including
Christopher
Stevens,
and
the
individuals
identified
in
the
following
Request
3
below.
3.
All
notes,
memoranda,
and
correspondence
generated
between
January
of
2007
and
September
11,
2012,
regarding
meetings
between
Christopher
Stevens
or
any
other
Tripoli
Embassy
official,
and
one
or
more
of
the
following
individuals:

Ahmed
Abu
Khattala,
a
commander
of
the
Libyan
Ansar
al-­‐
Shariah
militia
group

Mustafa
Abdul
Jalil,
Chairman
of
the
Libyan
National
Transitional
Council
from
5
March
2011-­‐8
August
2012
17

Mahmoud
Jibril,
Interim
Prime
Minister
of
Libya
and
Chair
of
\
the
Executive
Board
of
the
National
Transitional
Council
from
5
March-­‐23
October
2011

Wissam
bin
Hamid,
a
Libya
Shield
Brigade
commander,
supporter
of
the
Libyan
Muslim
Brotherhood
Justice
&
Construction
Party,
and
veteran
jihad
fighter
of
Iraq
&
Afghanistan,
who
provided
security
for
US
representatives
in
Benghazi
and
was
tentatively
identified
by
the
Library
of
Congress
as
the
head
of
al-­‐Qa’eda
in
Libya

Abdelhakim
Belhadj
(aka
Abdallah
al
Sadeq),
veteran
jihad
fighter
of
Iraq
&
Afghanistan,
commander
of
the
AQ
franchise
militia,
Libyan
Islamic
Fighting
Group
(LIFG)
(aka
Libyan
Islamic
Movement
for
Change),
post-­‐revolution
military
commander
of
Tripoli,
and
Libyan
delegation
leader
to
the
Syrian
Free
Army
in
late
2011

Ismael
al-­‐Sallabi
(brother
of
Ali),
commander
of
the
Al-­‐Qa’eda-­‐
linked
al-­‐Sahati
Brigade
during
the
revolution,
and
Benghazi
Military
Council
commander
afterwards,
close
ally
of
Abdelhakim
Belhadj
and
Mustafa
Jalil
3

Ali
al-­‐Sallabi
(brother
of
Ismael),
called
the
‘spiritual
leader’
of
the
Libyan
revolution,
Muslim
Brotherhood
links,
led
effort
with
Seif
al-­‐
Qaddafi
and
US
Embassy
Tripoli
to
gain
release
of
jihadi
detainees
from
Libyan
jails

Mohammad
al-­‐Sallabi,
father
of
Ali
and
Ismael,
among
the
founders
of
the
Libyan
Muslim
Brotherhood
in
the
1960s

Abu
Sufian
bin
Qumu,
veteran
jihad
fighter
in
Afghanistan
from
Derna,
Libya,
captured
in
2001,
detained
at
GITMO,
sent
back
to
Libyan
jail,
released
in
2010,
led
jihad
vs
Qaddafi
in
2011,
and
led
Benghazi
Mission
attack
in
Sep
2012.
4.
Any
other
records
of
whatsoever
nature
regarding
(1)
the
Benghazi
consulate
and
(2)
its
CIA
Annex,
for
the
time
period
of
January
1st,
2011,
through
September
30th,
2012.
This
request
is
all-­‐inclusive
for
all
records,
however
recorded,
including
emails,
reports,
memoranda,
correspondence,
teletypes,
telephone
calls,
text
messages,
and
audio
and
video
recordings,
regarding
all
uses
of
the
Benghazi
consulate
and
CIA
Annex.
5.
All
records
generated
between
September
11,
2012
and
the
present,
by
survivors
of
the
September
11th
and
12th
attacks
on
the
Benghazi
mission
and
the
Benghazi
CIA
Annex,
or
by
any
person
regarding
the
survivors’
accounts
of
the
attack.
6.
All
calendars,
day
books,
journals,
notes,
memoranda,
or
other
records
reflecting
Ambassador
Stevens’
schedule
on
September
11,
2012,
including
the
Ambassador’s
diary,
and
all
correspondence
to
or
from
the
Ambassador
regarding
his
meetings
that
day,
including
with
the
Turkish
Consul
General.
7.
All
records
of
the
purpose
of
Ambassador
Stevens’
meetings
on
September
11,
2012,
including
analysis
or
assessments
of
those
meetings,
whether
written
before
or
after
September
11,
2012.
8.
September
15th
or
16th
FBI
302
Interview
Reports,
and
corresponding
handwritten
notes,
of
interviews
conducted
in
Germany
of
United
States
personnel
who
had
been
in
the
Benghazi
mission
and
the
Benghazi
CIA
annex
during
the
September
11th
and
12th
attacks
on
those
facilities.
4
18
9.
Records
of
the
video
teleconference
on
the
afternoon
of
the
September
16th,
2012,
between
the
FBI
and
other
IC
officials
in
Washington,
regarding
FBI
interviews
with
U.S.
personnel
who
had
been
on
the
compounds
in
Benghazi
during
the
attack.
For
your
reference,
the
following
is
an
excerpt
from
the
December
30,
2012,
Senate
Committee
On
Homeland
Security
And
Governmental
Affairs,
“Flashing
Red:
A
Special
Report
On
The
Terrorist
Attack
At
Benghazi:”
On
September
15th
and
16th,
officials
from
the
FBI
conducted
face-­‐to-­‐face
interviews
in
Germany
of
the
U.S.
personnel
who
had
been
on
the
compound
in
Benghazi
during
the
attack.
The
U.S.
personnel
who
were
interviewed
saw
no
indications
that
there
had
been
a
protest
prior
to
the
attack.
Information
from
those
interviews
was
shared
on
a
secure
video
teleconference
on
the
afternoon
of
the
16th
with
FBI
and
other
IC
officials
in
Washington;
it
is
unclear
whether
the
question
of
whether
a
protest
took
place
was
discussed
during
this
video
conference.
10.
Complete
Autopsy
Reports
of
each
of
the
victims
of
the
September
11th
and
12th,
2012,
Benghazi
attacks
of
the
Ambassador’s
compound,
and
the
CIA
Annex.
Requests
to
the
CIA
FOIA
Requests.
These
requests
are
for
the
following
records
of
activities
in
Libya,
in
the
care,
custody
or
control
of
the
Central
Intelligence
Agency,
regardless
of
the
source
of
the
records:
1.
All
records
of
whatsoever
nature
regarding
(1)
the
Benghazi
Special
Mission
Compound
or
“Ambassador’s
compound”
or
“Benghazi
Mission”
and
(2)
the
CIA
Annex,
for
the
time
period
of
January
1st,
2011,
through
September
30th,
2012.
This
request
is
all-­‐inclusive
for
all
records,
however
recorded,
including
emails,
reports,
memoranda,
correspondence,
teletypes,
telephone
calls,
text
messages,
and
audio
and
video
recordings,
regarding
all
uses
of
the
Benghazi
Mission
and
the
CIA
Annex.
Responsive
records
include
those
that
disclose:
(1)
The
comings
and
goings
of
all
persons,
whether
civilian,
military,
American
or
foreign,
including
any
non-­‐US
personnel
questioned,
interrogated,
detained,
or
transported
through,
the
CIA
Annex
and
Benghazi
Mission;
(2)
The
descriptions
and
inventories
of
all
weapons
brought
into
the
Annex,
including
small
arms,
ammunition,
and
man-­‐portable
air
defense
systems,
or
Manpads,
and
missiles;
(3)
The
sources
of
all
such
weapons;
(4)
The
descriptions
and
inventories
of
all
weapons
removed
from
the
Annex,
(5)
The
intended
destinations
and
recipients
of
all
such
weaponry,
including
(i)
All
transfers
of
arms
and
equipment
to
Libyan
resistance
fighters,
both
before
or
after
the
United
Nations
recognized
the
National
Transitional
Council
as
the
legal
representative
of
Libya;
(ii)
Transportation
of
arms
out
of
Libya,
bound
for
Syria,
thorough
Turkey,
Qatar,
Saudi
Arabia,
Qatar,
or
Jordan;
(6)
All
communication
and
cryptographic
equipment
at
the
CIA
Annex
and
Benghazi
Mission;
(7)
The
weaponry,
communication,
cryptographic
equipment,
and
19
electronic
or
paper
files,
left
in
the
Annex
and
Benghazi
Mission
when
US
personnel
abandoned
these
facilities
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012;
(8)
Information
about
the
weapons
recovered
from
fallen
attackers
at
the
Ambassador’s
compound
as
well
as
the
CIA
Annex
during
and
after
the
attacks;
(9)
Information
about
the
identities
and
affiliations
of
any
of
those
fallen
fighters
as
well
as
the
disposition
of
their
bodies,
alive
or
dead;
and
(10)
CIA
situation
reports,
or
“sitreps,”
sent,
including
on
September
11th,
12th,
and
13th.
2.
Any
and
all
videos
depicting
the
United
States
Mission
in
Benghazi,
Libya
(including
the
Special
Mission
Compound
and
the
CIA
Annex)
between
September
10,
2012
and
September
12,
2012.
This
request
includes,
but
is
not
limited
to
(1)
all
videos
and
photographs
obtained,
transmitted,
or
recorded
via
any
unmanned
aerial
vehicles
(UAVs),
and
(2)
video
of
closed-­‐circuit
television
monitor
at
the
Benghazi
Mission
facility’s
Tactical
Operations
Center
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2013.
3.
All
records
generated
between
September
11,
2012
and
the
present,
by
survivors
of
the
September
11th
and
12th
attacks
on
the
Benghazi
mission
and
the
Benghazi
CIA
Annex,
or
by
any
person
regarding
the
survivors’
accounts
of
the
attack.
4.
All
records
of
radio
communications
emanating
from
the
Compound’s
Tactical
Operations
Center
(TOC),
on
September
11th
and
12th,
2012,
whether
made
by
Regional
Security
Officer
(RSO)
Alec
Henderson
or
any
other
person.
5.
All
records
of
CIA
Director
David
Petraeus’
actions
and
communications
for
the
24-­‐hour
period
beginning
when
first
notified
that
the
Benghazi
Mission
was
under
attack.
Responsive
records
include:
(1)
All
records
generated
by
Director
Petraeus,
including
all
emails,
memoranda,
or
notes;
(2)
Telephone
logs
or
bills
or
other
statements
of
all
of
his
telephone
calls
placed
or
received;
and
(3)
All
records
generated
by
anyone
about
the
CIA
Director’s
actions
and
communications.
6.
All
records
of
Deputy
CIA
Director
Michael
Morell
actions
and
communications
for
the
24-­‐hour
period
beginning
when
first
notified
that
the
Benghazi
Mission
was
under
attack.
Responsive
records
include:
(1)
All
records
generated
by
Deputy
CIA
Director
Morell,
including
all
emails,
memoranda,
or
notes;
(2)
Telephone
logs
or
bills
or
other
statements
of
all
of
his
telephone
calls
placed
or
received;
and
(3)
All
records
generated
by
anyone
about
the
CIA
Deputy
Director’s
actions
and
communications.
7.
Any
records
reflecting
the
time,
and
substance,
of
the
President’s
first
notification
that
the
Benghazi
Mission
was
under
attack,
and
his
actions,
and
communications,
for
the
next
24
hours.
8.
All
calendars,
day
books,
journals,
notes,
memoranda,
or
other
records
20
reflecting
Ambassador
Stevens’
schedule
on
September
11,
2012,
including
the
Ambassador’s
diary,
and
all
correspondence
to
or
from
the
Ambassador
regarding
his
meetings
that
day,
including
with
the
Turkish
Consul
General.
9.
All
records
of
the
purpose
of
Ambassador
Stevens’
meetings
on
September
11,
2012,
including
analysis
or
assessments
of
those
meetings,
whether
written
before
or
after
September
11,
2012.
10.
All
correspondence
to
or
from
Ambassador
Stevens
on
September
10th
and
11th,
2012.
11.
All
notes,
memoranda,
and
correspondence
generated
between
January
of
2007
and
September
11,
2012,
regarding
meetings
between
Christopher
Stevens
or
any
other
Tripoli
Embassy
official,
and
one
or
more
of
the
following
individuals:

Ahmed
Abu
Khattala,
a
commander
of
the
Libyan
Ansar
al-­‐
Shariah
militia
group

Mustafa
Abdul
Jalil,
Chairman
of
the
Libyan
National
Transitional
Council
from
5
March
2011-­‐8
August
2012

Mahmoud
Jibril,
Interim
Prime
Minister
of
Libya
and
Chair
of
the
Executive
Board
of
the
National
Transitional
Council
from
5\
March-­‐23
October
2011

Wissam
bin
Hamid,
a
Libya
Shield
Brigade
commander,
supporter
of
the
Libyan
Muslim
Brotherhood
Justice
&
Construction
Party,
and
veteran
jihad
fighter
of
Iraq
&
Afghanistan,
who
provided
security
for
US
representatives
in
Benghazi
and
was
tentatively
identified
by
the
Library
of
Congress
as
the
head
of
al-­‐Qa’eda
in
Libya

Abdelhakim
Belhadj
(aka
Abdallah
al
Sadeq),
veteran
jihad
fighter
of
Iraq
&
Afghanistan,
commander
of
the
AQ
franchise
militia,
Libyan
Islamic
Fighting
Group
(LIFG)
(aka
Libyan
Islamic
Movement
for
Change),
post-­‐revolution
military
commander
of
Tripoli,
and
Libyan
delegation
leader
to
the
Syrian
Free
Army
in
late
2011

Ismael
al-­‐Sallabi
(brother
of
Ali),
commander
of
the
Al-­‐Qa’eda-­‐
linked
al-­‐Sahati
Brigade
during
the
revolution,
and
Benghazi
Military
Council
commander
afterwards,
close
ally
of
Abdelhakim
Belhadj
and
Mustafa
Jalil

Ali
al-­‐Sallabi
(brother
of
Ismael),
called
the
‘spiritual
leader’
of
the
Libyan
revolution,
Muslim
Brotherhood
links,
led
effort
with
Seif
al-­‐Qaddafi
and
US
Embassy
Tripoli
to
gain
release
of
jihadi
detainees
from
Libyan
jails

Mohammad
al-­‐Sallabi,
father
of
Ali
and
Ismael,
among
the
founders
of
the
Libyan
Muslim
Brotherhood
in
the
1960s

Abu
Sufian
bin
Qumu,
veteran
jihad
fighter
in
Afghanistan
from
Derna,
Libya,
captured
in
2001,
detained
at
GITMO,
sent
back
to
Libyan
jail,
released
in
2010,
led
jihad
vs
Qaddafi
in
2011,
and
led
Benghazi
Mission
attack
in
Sep
2012.
12.
For
the
period
of
February
15th,
2011,
through
December
31st,
2012,
all
DOD
and
CIA
or
other
intelligence
community
records,
shared
with
members
of
Congress,
regarding
collection,
storage,
transportation
of
arms
and
equipment
in
Libya.
13.
For
the
period
of
February
15th,
2011,
through
December
31st,
2012,
all
DOD
and
CIA
or
other
intelligence
community
records
of
Congressional
21
approval
for
CIA
transport
of
arms
to
Syrian
rebel
forces.
14.
All
records
regarding
Deputy
National
Security
Adviser
for
Homeland
Security
and
Counter-­‐terrorism
John
Brennan’s
recommendations
regarding
the
overthrow
of
Libyan
leader
Muammar
Gaddafi.
15.
Records
of
the
video
teleconference
on
the
afternoon
of
the
September
16th,
2012,
between
the
FBI
and
other
IC
officials
in
Washington,
regarding
FBI
interviews
with
U.S.
personnel
who
had
been
on
the
compounds
in
Benghazi
during
the
attack.
For
your
reference,
the
following
is
an
excerpt
from
the
December
30,
2012,
Senate
Committee
On
Homeland
Security
And
Governmental
Affairs,
“Flashing
Red:
A
Special
Report
On
The
Terrorist
Attack
At
Benghazi:”
On
September
15th
and
16th,
officials
from
the
FBI
conducted
face-­‐to-­‐face
interviews
in
Germany
of
the
U.S.
personnel
who
had
been
on
the
compound
in
Benghazi
during
the
attack.
The
U.S.
personnel
who
were
interviewed
saw
no
indications
that
there
had
been
a
protest
prior
to
the
attack.
Information
from
those
interviews
was
shared
on
a
secure
video
teleconference
on
the
afternoon
of
the
16th
with
FBI
and
other
IC
officials
in
Washington;
it
is
unclear
whether
the
question
of
whether
a
protest
took
place
was
discussed
during
this
video
conference.
16.
Non-­‐Disclosure
Agreements
signed
by
survivors
of
the
Benghazi
attacks,
including
employees
or
contractors
of
the
CIA
or
DOD.
22
Appendix: Supporting Documents
Accuracy
in
Media
Press
Briefing
Primary
Source
Reporting
April
22,
2014
Subject:
Muammar
Qaddafi
Regime
Discussions
with
AFRICOM
about
Talks
under
“White
Flag
of
Truce”
Source:
Rear
Admiral
Charles
R.
Kubic,
CEC,
U.S.
Navy
(ret)
Shortly
after
NATO
officially
entered
the
Libyan
revolt
on
the
side
of
the
rebels
on
19
March
2011,
former
Libyan
ruler
Muammar
Qaddafi
expressed
willingness
to
discuss
directly
with
AFRICOM
the
possibility
of
abdication,
exile,
and
an
end
to
hostilities.
On
20
March
2011,
General
Abdulqader Yusef Dibri, head of Muammar Qaddafi’s
personal security, conveyed Qaddafi’s willingness to consider direct talks with the U.S.
government under a flag of truce. Upon receipt of this information, RADM
(ret.)
Chuck
Kubic
telephoned
LTC
Brian
Linvill
at
49
7117
293645
at
his
AFRICOM
office
in
Stuttgart,
Germany
(cell
phone
#
49
1515
258128).
LTC
Linvill
served
at
that
time
as
the
AFRICOM
point
of
contact
for
any
and
all
communications
involving
Qaddafi’s
Libyan
military
based
on
his
prior
service
in
Libya
(2008-­‐2011)
where
he
had
come
to
know
personally
all
of
Qaddafi’s
senior
military
staff.
RADM
Kubic
told
LTC
Linvill
that
he
had
information
through
an
intermediary
that
the
Libyans
were
ready
to
establish
a
direct
line
of
communication
with
the
U.S.
military
command.
Linvill
immediately
passed
this
information
up
his
chain
of
command
to
General
Carter
Ham,
Commander
of
U.S.
AFRICOM.
AFRICOM
responded
quickly
and
with
interest
in
setting
up
a
direct
line
of
military-­‐to-­‐military
communication
with
Gen.
Dibri.
On
21
March
2011,
General
Ahmed
Mamud
(a
senior
aide
to
Qaddafi)
telephoned
LTC
Linvill
directly
in
Stuttgart,
Germany
and
declared
the
following:
§ The
Libyans
wished
to
declare
a
72-­‐hour
truce
for
the
purpose
of
conducting
negotiations
on
the
terms
of
a
formal
ceasefire.
§ The
talks
could
be
held
in
Tripoli,
Libya
between
Major General Abu-Bakr
Yunis Jabr, the Libyan Defense Minister, and General Carter Ham.
§ If these conditions are acceptable, the Libyans will stop all combat operations
immediately and withdraw all military forces to the outskirts of all cities, and
assume a defensive posture.
§ To ensure credibility with the international community, the Libyans recommend
observers from the African Union be invited into Libya to ensure the truce is
honored.
23
That night, on NBC News, Gen. Ham issued a statement asserting that the U.S. military
was not targeting Muammar Qaddafi. By 22 March 2011, Qaddafi verifiably had begun
to pull his forces back from key rebel-held cities such as Benghazi and Misrata. Word
was passed that he wanted a way out of the crisis and was willing to step down and
permit a transition government to take power in his stead. Qaddafi reportedly sought only
two conditions:
§ Permit him to go after Al-Qa’eda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); and
§ Remove sanctions against him, his family, and those loyal to him.
Despite the willingness of both AFRICOM Commander Gen. Carter Ham and Muammar
Qaddafi to pursue the possibility of truce talks, permission was not given to Gen. Ham
from his chain of command in the Pentagon and the window of opportunity closed.
24
Members of the Citizens’ Commission on Benghazi
Roger Aronoff, Editor of Accuracy in Media
Roger Aronoff, Editor of Accuracy in Media, is also AIM’s Executive
Secretary. Aronoff has worked as a journalist, TV producer, director, writer and
distributor. He also hosts AIM’s show on BlogTalkRadio, “Take AIM.” Roger joined
AIM in May of 1997 and has written, produced and directed award-winning
documentaries including Confronting Iraq: Conflict and Hope, The Clinton Legacy and
TWA 800: The Search for the Truth. Aronoff has appeared as a guest commentator on
National Public Radio, Air America, CNN, Fox News, CNBC’s “Kudlow & Company,”
Court TV, Russia Today, and CTV (Canadian TV), among others. A University of Texas
graduate with a B.A. in History, Aronoff has worked as a freelance journalist in South
Africa and a columnist for the Jewish Herald Voice, and as a producer of syndicated
radio and TV musical/variety programs, including “Woodstock: Ten Years Later,”
“Billboard’s Artist of the Year,” “No Place But Texas,” and “Bravisimo.”
In 2008 Aronoff produced, directed and co-wrote a documentary that aired on many PBS
stations called “Fighting Words: A Tale of How Liberals Created Neoconservatism,” and
in 2009 produced a weekly public affairs show on PBS called “Think Tank with Ben
Wattenberg.”
Captain Larry Bailey (SEAL) USN Ret.
Captain Larry Bailey, a native of Marshall, TX, and a graduate of Stephen F. Austin State
College, spent almost 27 years as a U.S. Navy SEAL. Obtaining his commission from
Navy Officer Candidate School in 1962, he was first assigned to the destroyer USS
LEARY before receiving orders to Underwater Demolition Team training in Little Creek,
VA. After a year in UDT-22, he was assigned to SEAL Team TWO, where he spent
almost five years and with whom he participated in the Dominican Republic invasion and
deployed to Vietnam, where he led the first East Coast SEAL platoon into combat.
Included in Captain Bailey’s duty stations were the Philippines, Panama, Bolivia, and
Scotland. He commanded Naval Special Warfare Center, where all SEALs are trained,
for three years and retired in 1990 from the U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa,
FL.
Since his retirement, Captain Bailey has been involved in issues of national policy and
has chaired Gathering of Eagles since 2007. He is also co-chairman of Special
Operations Speaks, an organization that speaks out on defense-related issues, particularly
those involving special operations forces. He and his wife Judy live in Chocowinity, NC,
and are the parents of two adult children.
25
Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Benway, U.S. Army Special Forces (Retired)
Lieutenant Colonel Ken Benway enlisted in the U.S. Army as a parachute infantryman in
1966. He underwent Army Special Forces training and deployed to Vietnam, serving
from 1967-68, as a Special Forces medic with a Chinese Nung Company of the I Corps
Mobile Strike Force, 5th Special Forces Group. In 1970, he was commissioned as
Second Lieutenant of Infantry, serving in leadership assignments in both Germany and
Italy with the 509th Parachute Infantry. Over the course of 27 years in uniform, he
served with the 3d, 5th and 10 Special Forces Groups, with the Special Operations
Command (Europe), as an exchange program officer with the Susa Alpine Infantry
Battalion (Italian Army) in northwest Italy, and with the US Army JFK Special Warfare
Center and School.
On retiring in 1993, he served as senior special operations analyst, program manager and
corporate director in a variety of contracted support arrangements with the U.S. Army
Special Operations community.
Col. Dick Brauer Jr., USAF (Ret.)
Colonel Richard F. (“Dick”) Brauer Jr. USAF, (Ret) amassed 5,200 hours of worldwide
flying, attaining the aeronautical rating of Master Navigator. His tours of flying duty and
deployments include Southeast Asia/Vietnam (1967-68), Europe, Central and South
America (1968- 1971) and Australia (1971-1973), where he represented the USAF and
the United States as an Exchange Officer, flying as an instructor in the Royal Australian
Air Force (RAAF).
Following his Pentagon tour he was selected to be the 12th Commandant of the United
States Air Force Special Operations School (Hurlburt Field, FL) and served the joint
SOF, conventional and interagency communities in that education leadership position
from 1986 until his retirement in 1991, having completed 26 years of active duty military
service. In 2010 Colonel Brauer was inducted into the Air Commando Hall of Fame.
Lt. Col. Dennis B. Haney, USAF (Ret.)
Lt. Col. Dennis B. Haney, USAF (Ret) is a program manager, a U.S. Air Force jet fighter
aircraft operations director, flight test director, and combat-experienced Electronic
Warfare Officer with 22 years of experience as an Electronic Combat technical expert.
He served three years on the 52nd Tactical Fighter Wing Staff in Spangdahlem AB,
Germany, and has served in a number of positions at The Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory. He assisted the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)
Program Manager in managing 185 technical personnel in positions including Assistant
Program Manager for the CEC Program. After retiring, he joined Special Operations
Speaks (SOS) as the Operations Coordinator.
26
B/Gen. Charles Jones, USAF (Ret.)
Charles Jones, B/Gen., USAF (RET) served continuously in the Air Force and Air Force
Reserves from 1954 to 1986. He is the founder, and was Chairman, now retired, of the
National Veterans Coalition, an arm of the Constitution Party. He is a member of Stand
up America and serves on the advisory Kitchen Cabinet. He is a lifetime member of both
the Order of Daedalians, (a Fraternal Organization of Military Pilots) and the Military
Officers Association of America, a veterans association dedicated to maintaining a strong
national defense.
Clare Lopez, former CIA officer
Clare M. Lopez is Vice President for Research and Analysis at the Center for Security
Policy and a Senior Fellow at The Clarion Project, the London Center for Policy
Research, and the Canadian Meighen Institute. Also the Vice President of the Intelligence
Summit, she formerly was a career operations officer with the Central Intelligence
Agency, a professor at the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies, Executive
Director of the Iran Policy Committee from 2005-2006, and has served as a consultant,
intelligence analyst, and researcher for a variety of defense firms. She was named a
Lincoln Fellow at the Claremont Institute in 2011.
Admiral James Lyons (Ret.)
Retired Admiral James “Ace” Lyons is a former four star admiral, Commander-in-Chief
of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and the Father of the Navy Seal Red Cell Program. His other
commands include U.S. Second Fleet, NATO Striking Fleet, as well as Seventh Fleet
Logistic Force plus several ship commands. As the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
from 1983 to 1985, he was principal advisor on all Joint Chiefs of Staff matters. He also
served as Senior U.S. Military Representative to the United Nations. He is a graduate of
the U.S. Naval Academy and has received post-graduate degrees from the U.S. Naval
War College and the U.S. National Defense University.
General Thomas McInerney (Ret.)
Retired General Thomas McInerney served overseas in NATO, Pacific Air Forces and as
commander of 11th Air Force in Alaska. Currently, he is a Fox News contributor, and is a
member of the Iran Policy Committee. From 1994, McInerney was Director of the
Defense Performance Review (DPR), reporting to the Secretary of Defense and Vice
President Al Gore who conceived this initiative for the Federal Government. In that
capacity, McInerney led the Pentagon’s “reinventing government” effort, focused on
making government more efficient by using the latest and best business practices.
Col. Wayne Morris USMC (Ret.)
Retired USMC Colonel Wayne Morris is President at WAYMOR Inc. He has more than
34 years of service in the United States Marine Corps. Rising from Private to Staff
27
Sergeant and then, via a Combat Leadership Commission during Vietnam, from Second
Lieutenant to Colonel, he retired in 1996. He was the Human Resources Director of
Onslow County, North Carolina Local Government from 1997 to 2005 and was a Senior
Operations Advisor to the Afghan National Army 2006 to 2007.
Chet Nagle
Chet Nagle is a Naval Academy graduate, a Georgetown Law School graduate, and a
Cold War carrier pilot who flew in the Cuban Missile Crisis. He joined International
Security Affairs (ISA) as a Pentagon civilian involved in international defense projects.
Afterwards, he lived abroad for 12 years as a director of Aeromaritime, Inc and an agent
for the CIA, working in Iran, Oman, and many other countries. Along the way, he
founded a geo-political magazine, The Journal of Defense & Diplomacy. At the end of
his work in the Middle East, he was awarded the Order of Oman for his role in Oman’s
victory against communist Yemen. Nagle’s first book, Iran Covenant, is a fact-based
novel about Iran’s nuclear weapons program and the use of EMP to end it. His second
novel is The Woolsorters Plague. It describes an attack on Washington, DC, by terrorists
with biological weapons made in Iran. He has appeared often on radio (including the
Monica Crowley Fox News show, Rick Wiles’ TruNews, and the Hugh Hewitt Show)
and television (including Stakelbeck on Terror on CBN, and Faster Please on PJTV)). He
also appeared in Iranium, a documentary film about Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
Nagle is a contributing editor for Family Security Matters, contributes to Daily Caller,
and writes for various clients. His website is http://www.chetnagle.com.
John A. Shaw
John A. Shaw is the Senior Partner of the Cambridge Consulting Group, an international
consulting firm specializing in trade, energy, and technology, especially the growing
market of defense and dual-use technology. He has had a forty-year career focused on
technology transfer, arms sales, and international development, with intensive experience
in Europe and the Middle East. He has held senior management positions in the U.S.
government and in major international management consulting firms.
At the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2005, Mr. Shaw served as Deputy
Undersecretary of Defense for International Technology Security, a position created for
him to assure that U.S. export controls are based on a solid technological understanding
of the potential military and dual-use employment of all U.S. technology. Mr. Shaw was
part of the office of the Undersecretary for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics
(AT&L) and oversaw all international technology transfers and military sales involving
U.S. technology in that area. Mr. Shaw at the same time served as Director, International
Armament and Technology Trade (IATT), an arm of the DoD Inspector General’s office
tasked with policing international technology exports.
In addition, his background as Inspector General together with his appointment as the
technical IG trouble shooter for transportation and communications in Iraq surfaced the
largest corruption case in Iraqi reconstruction: The fixing of the 3 billion dollar telecom
28
tender in 2003 involving tens of millions of dollars of bribes to American and British
officials by an Iraqi billionaire with the aid of British intelligence. Efforts by the
perpetrators of the fix to try to smear Shaw resulted in his complete exoneration by the
FBI and Department of Justice.
Mr. Shaw also established that massive amounts of high explosives and chemical
weapons were clandestinely moved to Syria by Russian troops just before the beginning
of the Iraq war. Those Iraqi chemical weapons provided a massive foundation for the
current Syrian arsenal of chemical weapons. Shaw’s efforts established definitively the
presence of WMD in Iraq and the way in which they were dispersed despite a widespread
international effort to cover up their presence.
Mr. Shaw served on the White House staff in the Ford, Reagan, and Bush I
administrations, and was White House liaison at the Defense, State, and Commerce
Departments. He oversaw the personnel transitions at Defense in 1975 and 2001, at State
in 1981, and at Commerce in 1989.
Mr. Shaw received an A.B. with Highest Honors in History from Williams College in
1962, a B.A. (Cantab.), and an M.A. from Cambridge University in 1964 and 1967. He
received a Ph.D. from Cambridge in 1972 and was Executive Secretary to Sir Herbert
Butterfield in the formation of the Diplomatic Studies Group. He has taught international
affairs at Cambridge, Williams, Georgetown, and the Institute Politique in Paris.
Kevin Shipp, former CIA officer
Kevin Shipp, a former CIA Officer and Antiterrorism expert, held several high level
positions in the CIA. He was assigned as a protective agent for the Director of Central
Intelligence, a counterintelligence investigator, a Counter Terrorism Center officer, a
team leader protecting sensitive CIA assets from assassination, a manager of high-risk
protective operations, a lead instructor for members of allied governments, an internal
staff security investigator, and a polygraph examiner. He was tasked with protecting the
CIA from foreign agent penetration and the chief of training for the CIA federal police
force. Mr. Shipp functioned as program manager for the Department of State, Diplomatic
Security, and Anti Terrorism Assistance global police training program. He is the
recipient of two CIA Meritorious Unit Citations, three Exceptional Performance Awards
and a Medallion for overseas covert operations. He is the author of From the Company
of Shadows–CIA Operations and the War on Terrorism.
Wayne Simmons, former CIA officer
Wayne Simmons spent 27 years working with the CIA to combat terrorism, narcoterrorism
and narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, counterfeiting, cyber-terrorists, and
industrial and economic espionage. He sits on the Advisory Council for the Intelligence
Summit, and is a contributor to the conservative publication Human Events. Simmons has
been a Terrorism Analyst for the Fox News Channel since 2002.
29
General Paul Vallely (Ret.)
Retired General Paul Vallely served in the Vietnam War and retired in 1993 as Deputy
Commanding General, Pacific Command. In 2004, together with retired Air Force
Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney, he co-authored the book Endgame: The
Blueprint for Victory in the War on Terror. He is the Chairman of Stand Up America and
Nemo Arms Company. Vallely has lent his support to the organization Veteran
Defenders of America.
Former Congressman and Retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Allen West
Former Congressman and Retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Allen West is a current
contributor for Fox News and P.J. Media. Before taking office, he was an adviser to the
Afghan National Army. On January 3, 2011, West took office as the first black
Republican Congressman from Florida since Josiah T. Walls left office in 1876. West
was also a member of the Tea Party Caucus and has been referred to as one of the
champions of the Tea Party movement.
CCB Advisory Members:
Steven Emerson, Executive Director, Investigative Project on Terrorism
Steven Emerson is considered one of the leading authorities on Islamic extremist
networks, financing and operations. He serves as the Executive Director of The
Investigative Project on Terrorism, one of the world’s largest storehouses of archival data
and intelligence on Islamic and Middle Eastern terrorist groups. Emerson and his staff
frequently provide briefings to U.S. government and law enforcement agencies, members
of Congress and congressional committees, and print and electronic media, both national
and international. Since 9-11, Emerson has testified before and briefed Congress dozens
of times on terrorist financing and operational networks of Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah,
Islamic Jihad, and the rest of the worldwide Islamic militant spectrum.
Emerson is the author or co-author of six books on terrorism and national security. He
and his organization have been quoted or profiled in hundreds of newspaper and
television stories since 9-11.
Emerson is recognized as one of the first terrorism experts to have testified and warned
about the threat of Islamic militant networks operating in the United States and their
connections worldwide. In a pioneering congressional testimony delivered in 1998, he
specifically warned about the threat of Osama Bin Laden’s network. Nearly every one of
the terrorist suspects and groups first identified in his 1994 film have been indicted,
convicted, or deported since 9-11.
Pete Hoekstra, Senior Fellow, Investigative Project on Terrorism
The Honorable Pete Hoekstra is an IPT Shillman Senior Fellow, specializing in national
30
security, international relations, global terrorism and cyber security.
Mr. Hoekstra served in the United States Congress for 18 years, representing Michigan’s
2nd Congressional District from 1993 to 2011. After leaving the House, he became a
senior advisor at Dickstein Shapiro LLP, consulting on intelligence and national security,
education, and labor matters. He serves on the Board of Directors of Gentex, Inc. and
West Michigan Community Bank, and the Advisory Boards of Newsmax and
TransCertain.
Congressman Hoekstra was named chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence in 2004 and held the post until January 2007. He served as the top
Republican on the committee until January 2011. He was responsible for helping to lead
Congressional oversight of U.S. intelligence during its modernization to confront the
threats of the 21st century global war on terror, including restructuring the intelligence
community with landmark legislation following the 9-11 Commission report. Prior to his
appointment as committee chairman, Pete served as chairman of the Subcommittee on
Technical and Tactical Intelligence.
Congressman Hoekstra is a graduate of Holland Christian Schools. He holds a bachelor’s
degree in political science from Hope College and a master’s of Business Administration
from the University of Michigan. He was born in Groningen, the Netherlands, and
immigrated to Michigan with his family at the age of 3.
The Muslim Brotherhood: How Did Its Influence Become So Powerful?
§ The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamic organization, founded by Hasan al-Banna
in Cairo, Egypt in 1928, that is dedicated to restoration of the Caliphate and
global enforcement of Islamic Law (shariah).
§ Known as the Ikhwan in Arabic, the Brotherhood’s motto is: “Allah is our
objective, the Prophet is our leader, the Qur’an is our law, jihad is our way, and
dying in the way of Allah is our highest aspiration.”
§ With a presence in over 80 countries worldwide, the Ikhwan pursues its dual
objectives (Caliphate and shariah) by pre-violent dawah (proselytizing, or the
“call to Islam”), “civilization jihad” (or “stealth jihad”), as well as violent jihad.
§ “The Project” is a 14-page document dated December 1, 1982 that was seized in a
2001 raid on a Swiss villa belonging to Yousef Nada, the Muslim Brotherhood
director of the Al-Taqwa bank that had funded al-Qa’eda.
§ “The Project” outlines a campaign of progressive infiltration of the structures of
Western society in order to achieve Islamic domination over the West.
§ Among the tactics to be used are deception, infiltration and “[i]nvolving
ideologically committed Muslims in democratically-elected institutions on all
levels in the West, including government.”
§ The 2008 U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation et.al. was the largest terrorism financing
trial in U.S. history, and brought to light extensive documentation about Muslim
Brotherhood activities and plans in the U.S.
§ A 2004 raid by the FBI on the home of Ismail el-Barasse discovered the archives
of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood, including a document called “An Explanatory
Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America.”
§ The Memorandum makes clear the Brothers are engaged in America in “a kind of
grand jihad” whose goal is “eliminating and destroying Western civilization from
within.”
§ An attachment to the Memorandum lists 29 groups under the heading “A list of
our organizations and the organizations of our friends” among which are the
Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Muslim Students Association
(MSA), and the Islamic Association of Palestine (IAP–later to become CAIR, the
Council on American Islamic Relations).
§ Those and other Muslim Brotherhood organizations today are among the most
influential, mainstream Islamic groups in the country despite their known
allegiance to a jihadist ideology.
2
§ Top officials of these Ikhwan groups advise, socialize with, and train the
leadership of key agencies within the U.S. national security community.
§ The Muslim Brotherhood has achieved information dominance inside the U.S.
government about Islam, Islamic terrorism, and the nature and objectives of the
Brotherhood itself.
§ The 2011-2012 USG-wide purge of all curriculum training materials and
instructors who taught the linkage between Islamic terrorism and its inspirational
sources in the doctrine, law, and scriptures of Islam was undertaken under
pressure from Brotherhood groups and neutralized U.S. national security efforts to
counter Brotherhood influence operations.
§ The disastrous consequences of this effort became evident in official U.S. backing
for the 2011 Brotherhood- and al-Qa’eda-dominated Islamic uprisings known as
the “Arab Spring.”
§ U.S. official support for the Muslim Brotherhood political leadership and al-
Qa’eda militias that ousted Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi led directly to the 11
September 2012 attacks on our mission in Benghazi and the chaos that grips
Libya today.
Additional Suggested Resources
§ “An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in
North America” Online at http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/judges/hlf2/09-25-
08/Elbarasse%20Search%203.pdf
§ Lopez, Clare M., “History of the Muslim Brotherhood Penetration of the U.S.
Government.” The Gatestone Institute, April 15, 2013. Online at
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3672/muslim-brotherhood-us-government
§ Poole, Patrick, “Blind to Terror: The U.S. Government’s Disastrous Muslim
Outreach Efforts and the Impact on U.S. Middle East Policy.” Middle East
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 2013). Online at
http://www.gloria-center.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Blind-to-Terror-The-
US-Goverments-Disastrous-Muslim-Outreach-Efforts-and-the-Impact-on-USMidEast-
Policy.pdf
§ Poole, Patrick, “The Muslim Brotherhood ‘Project,’” Front Page Magazine, May
11, 2006. Online at http://archive.frontpagemag.com/Printable.aspx?ArtId=4476
3
Anatomy
of
the
Cover-­‐Up
§ “Innocence of Muslims” was a 14-minute video trailer about the life of
Muhammad posted to YouTube on 2 Jul 2012 by “Sam Bacile.”
§ In the aftermath of the 11 September 2012 attack on the U.S. mission in
Benghazi, Libya, the U.S. administration ignored facts in evidence indicating that
it was an al-Qa’eda-linked terrorist attack not preceded by any demonstration or
protest and publicly blamed the video instead.
§ The coordinated nature of the international campaign by U.S. Muslim
Brotherhood groups and member states of the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC) presents the impression that condemnation of the film was
used to further an agenda supportive of the OIC/Muslim Brotherhood objective to
criminalize criticism of Islam and curtail American Constitutional free speech
rights.
Demands for Release of the Blind Sheikh
§ During most of 2012, pressure for the release of Omar Abdulrahman (“The Blind
Sheikh”) featured prominently in discussions between the White House and the
Morsi Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt as well as among Gama’at al-
Islamiyya and Muslim Brotherhood figures, at least one of whom (Hani Nour
Eldin) visited WDC to discuss the issue with National Security Council official
Denis McDonough.
§ 4 Sep 12: Film producer, an ex-pat Egyptian Coptic Christian, phoned al Youm al
Sabaa (Seventh Day) daily newspaper in WDC area and emailed him a copy of
the film trailer.
§ 6 Sep 12: Gamel Girgis wrote a 3 paragraph article, calling the movie “shocking.”
§ 8 Sep 12: “Other newspapers” began running the story; al Youm al Sabaa ran a
follow-up.
§ 8 Sep 12: Gama’at al-Islamiyya, Egyptian Islamic Jihad jointly issued a statement
threatening to burn down Cairo Embassy unless the Blind Sheikh is released.
§ 9 Sep 12: Arabic-language forum posted a statement inciting Egyptians [O, sons
of Egypt!] to target the U.S. Embassy, indicating “U.S. Embassy shouldn’t remain
in Egypt” until the Blind Sheikh was released.
Appearance of the YouTube Video
4
§ 9 Sep 12: al-Nas Egyptian TV host Khaled Abdullah aired a clip of “Innocence of
Muslims” and invited viewer outrage.
§ 9 Sep 12: The Grand Mufti of al-Azhar condemned the clip for “insulting the
prophet.”
§ 9 Sep 12: Facebook pages appeared, calling for 9/11 protests; callers asked U.S.
Embassy in Cairo about the video, but they knew nothing about it at that time.
§ 11 Sep 12: CNN Nic Robertson was outside Cairo Embassy interviewing
protesters who wanted the Blind Sheikh released. Interviews included a one-onone
with Mohamed al-Zawahiri, brother of al-Qa’eda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Violence broke out immediately afterwards.
§ 11 Sep 12: CNN began to highlight the film narrative.
§ 11 Sep 12 : Protests against the video broke out in over three dozen countries.
§ 11 Sep 12: Military assault on the Benghazi mission began at 2140 local time that
night. No demonstration or protest preceded the attack.
§ 13-29 Sep: The YouTube clip eventually reached more than 17 million hits.
Aftermath of the Benghazi Attack: Cover-Up Begins
§ 12 Sep 12: President Obama in the White House Rose Garden used phrase “no act
of terror…” but did not specifically call the Benghazi attack an act of terror.
§ 13 Sep 12: Jay Carney: “The protests we’re seeing around the region are in
reaction to this movie…”
§ 14 Sep 12: Jay Carney said “protests were in reaction to a video.”
§ Few days after 11 Sep 12: At Tyrone Woods’ funeral, Secretary of State Clinton
assured father Charles Woods that they were going to “arrest and prosecute” the
man that made the YouTube video critical of Islam.
§ 28 Sep 12: Film producer “Mark Basseley Youssef” arrested, sentenced to 1 year
in jail for “probation violations.”
5
§ 16 Sep 12: Libyan President Mohamed Magariaf told Bob Schieffer on “Face the
Nation”: “…this leaves us with no doubt that this was preplanned, determined—
pre-meditated months ago, and they were planning this criminal act since their
arrival.”
§ 16 Sep 12: Amb. Susan Rice appeared on five Sunday talk shows, including
“Face the Nation,” directly after Libyan president and said:
o “We do not have information at present that leads us to conclude that this
was premeditated or preplanned.”
o “What happened in Cairo, in Benghazi, in many other parts of the region
was a result – a direct result of a heinous and offensive video.”
§ 18 Sep 12: Jay Carney said “…it was the video that caused the unrest in Cairo,
and the video and the unrest in Cairo that helped–that precipitated some of the
unrest in Benghazi…”
§ 19 Sep 12: Jay Carney said “we do not yet have indication that it was preplanned.”
§ 19 Sep 12: Matt Olson, NCTC to Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Chairman Joe Lieberman, on whether the attack was a terrorist attack: “They were
killed in the course of a terrorist attack on our embassy.”
§ 20 Sep 12: Jay Carney admitted it was terrorism in Benghazi.
§ 20 Sep 12: Obama at Univision townhall meeting said: “What we do know is that
the natural protests that arose because of the outrage over the video were used as
an excuse by extremists to see if they can also directly harm U.S. interests.”
§ 21 Sep 12: Secretary of State Clinton admitted the attacks were an act of terror
and after that, except for UN speeches, the video narrative was abandoned.
U.S. Muslim Brotherhood Chimes In
§ 17 Sep 12: The American Muslim website published Tariq Ramadan comments
http://theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/an-appeal-to-theconscience-
of-muslims
o “…After the Danish cartoons, the Dutch video Fitna and several lowgrade
irritants, a short, crudely executed—and scrupulously insulting—
film has inflamed deep-seated resentment. Several hundreds of furious
6
demonstrators gathered in front of the American Embassy in Cairo and the
US Consulate in Benghazi, Libya. In the confusion and violence, a US
Ambassador and three diplomats were killed.’
o ‘The violent reactions to the insults uttered against the Prophet [PBUH]
have driven many Muslims to behaviours far removed from the principles
of Islam.’
o ‘But behind the celebration of freedom of speech hides the arrogance of
ideologists and well-fed racists who feed off the multiform humiliation of
Muslims and to demonstrate the clear “superiority” of their civilisation or
the validity of their resistance to the “cancer” of retrograde Islam. In
criticising this ideological stance there can be no compromise either.’
§ 20 Sep 12: The American Muslim website published a collection of statements by
U.S. Muslim Brotherhood groups
http://theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/muslims-and-muslimorganizations-
condemn-attacks-on-u.s.-embassies
o ISNA statement condemned “depicting Prophet Muhammad….in a very
profane manner.”
o ISNA “condemned the creation of such a hateful video, and we also call
for an end to support for such mechanisms of hatred and bigotry.”
o “…nothing justifies violent acts…”
o MPAC condemned attacks on U.S. missions in both Cairo and Benghazi.
o “The attacks come after a low-budget movie on YouTube called
“Muhammad” incited anger by depicting Prophet Muhammad (peace be
upon him) in a demeaning and degrading manner.”
o CAIR issued a video aimed at demonstrators in Nigeria “It is clear that the
motive behind the film is to enrage Muslims and to display a hatred of
Islam” appealing for calm.
o ICNA appealed for calm and added: “We also appeal to the larger
American public to be wary of such attempts by individuals and groups,
who in most cases have foreign ties, engaging in such hateful projects that
not only endanger American and others’ lives overseas, but also incite hate
attacks against minorities in America as well.”
7
§ 17 Sep 12: Ahmed Rehab, Executive Director of CAIR-Chicago spoke on a local
radio show about violence, anti-American protests resulted from anti-Muslim
film. http://www.ahmedrehab.com/2012/09/wbez-worldview-ahmed-rehab-talksabout-
muslim-film-protest-violence/#more-3189
§ 19 Oct 12: University of Wisconsin-Madison scheduled an MSA event on
“Islamophobia.”
UN Speeches
§ 25 September 2012: President Obama’s UN speech cited the YouTube film
multiple times.
o U.S. president bowed to Islamic Law on slander: “The future must not
belong to those who slander the prophet of Islam”
o “Voices of tolerance that rally vs….blasphemy”
§ 25 September 2012: Pakistani PM Ali Zardari spoke.
o “The international community must not become silent observers and
should criminalize such acts that destroy the peace of the world and
endanger world security by misusing freedom of expression.”
§ 26 September 2012 : Egyptian President Morsi’s UN speech explicitly rejected
free speech, implied speech causes violence, emphasized UN responsibility to
“address” speech that causes violence.
o “UNGA as well as UNSC has the principle responsibility in addressing
this phenomenon that is starting to have implications that clearly affect
international peace & security”
o “Egypt respects freedom of expression” but “one that is not used to incite
hatred against anyone. One that is not directed toward one specific
religion…”
o “The obscenities that I have referred to that were recently released as part
of an organized campaign against Islamic sanctities are unacceptable.”
(YouTube video)
o “We reject this. We cannot accept it,” Morsi said, his voice thin with
anger. “We will not allow anyone to do this by word or deed.”
8
o “We have a responsibility in this international gathering to study how we
can protect the world from instability and hatred.”
§ 28 September 2012: Turkish FoMin Ahmet Davutoglu
o “Unfortunately, Islamophobia has also become a new form of racism like
anti-Semitism. It can no longer be tolerated under the guise of freedom of
expression. Freedom does not mean anarchy.”
§ 29 September 2012: OIC SecGen Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu spoke to OIC FoMins at
UN Headquarters.
o Annual Coordination meeting of OIC FoMins held on sidelines of UNGA
session in NYC adopted declaration condemning the sacrilegious act of
releasing the “defamatory video.”
o OIC blamed the Benghazi attack on the film: “…serious consequences of
abusing the principle of freedom of expression…”
o Called for “adopting measures to criminalize incitement to imminent
violence based on religion or belief.”
o 29 Sep 12: During AP Interview. OIC SecGen spoke even more directly
and issued thinly-veiled threats.
o “If the Western world fails to understand the sensitivity of the Muslim
world, then we are in trouble…Such provocations pose ‘a threat to
international peace and security and the sanctity of life.’”
o “You have to see that there is a provocation. You should understand the
psychology of people who revere their prophet and don’t want people to
insult him.”
9
Material Support to Terrorism: The Case of Libya
Clare Lopez — April 22, 2014
http://www.aim.org/aim-column/material-support-to-terrorism-the-case-of-libya/
Libya in 2011 marks the place and the time that the United States (U.S.) and the Obama
administration formally switched sides in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). A mere 10
years after al-Qa’eda (supported by Hizballah and Iran) attacked the American homeland
in the worst act of terrorism ever suffered by this country, U.S. leadership decided to
facilitate the provision of weapons to jihadist militias known to be affiliated with al-
Qa’eda and the Muslim Brotherhood in order to bring down a brutal dictator who also
just happened to be a U.S. ally in the GWOT at the time.
And the U.S. media were silent. The major broadcast, print, and Internet outlets said not a
word about this astonishing turnabout in American foreign policy. To this day, they have
not seemed even to recognize that the pivot to support al-Qa’eda took place. But it needs
to be said. The American people deserve to understand that their most senior leaders,
both elected and appointed, have violated their oaths to “preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.”
10
United States law is quite explicit about providing material support to terrorists: it’s
prohibited. Period. 18 U.S. Code § 2339A and 18 U.S. Code § 2339B address Providing
Material Support to Terrorists or Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Together,
these two sections outlaw the actions of any U.S. person who attempts or conspires to
provide, or actually does provide, material support to a foreign terrorist organization
knowing that it has been designated a foreign terrorist organization or engages, or has
engaged, in “terrorism” or “terrorist activity.” Conspiracy means agreeing or planning to
provide such support, whether or not such support ever is actually delivered. Penalties for
conspiracy to provide material support to terrorism are stiff: imprisonment for up to 15
years and/or a fine of not more than $250,000. Penalties for actually providing or
attempting to provide material support to terrorism are even harsher: imprisonment from
15 years to life, with a life sentence applicable if the death of any person results from
such crime. Aiding, abetting, counseling, or procuring in support of a violation of Section
2339B is punishable by the same penalties as for the offense itself.
The Arms Export Control Act is another law that makes it illegal for the U.S. government
to export “munitions” to any country determined by the Secretary of State to have
“repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” While this provision
applies specifically to those countries—Cuba, North Korea, Iran, and Syria—that are
designated as state sponsors of terrorism, the case of Libya stands out nevertheless.
Removed from the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism in 2006, Libya
by early 2011 was swarming with al-Qa’eda and Muslim Brotherhood militias and
affiliates fighting to overthrow Muamar Qaddafi’s regime.
The identities of those jihadis and their al-Qa’eda affiliations were well known to the
U.S. Intelligence Community, Department of State, and Tripoli Embassy long before the
17 February 2011 revolt broke out against Muamar Qaddafi. As with other al-Qa’eda
branches, the Libyan al-Qa’eda affiliates such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
(LIFG) trace their origins back to the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya, which was founded
in 1949 when Egyptian Brotherhood members “fled a crackdown in Cairo and took
refuge in Benghazi,” according to a May 2012 study by the Brookings Doha Center.
Colonel Muamar Qaddafi took over Libya in a 1969 coup d’état and showed little
tolerance for Brotherhood activities. Brutal waves of repression kept the Brotherhood in
check through the 1980s and 1990s when many Libyan fighters went to Afghanistan to
join the mujahedeen in their battle against the Soviet Army. Some of those who fought
there, like Abu Anas al-Libi and Abdelhakim Belhadj, would figure prominently in the
revolt that ultimately ousted Qaddafi in 2011.
The LIFG was founded in 1990 by Libyan fighters returning from the Afghan jihad who
were now intent on waging jihad at home. Qaddafi came down hard on the group, though,
and crushed the LIFG’s 1995-1998 insurgency. Some LIFG members had moved to
11
Sudan when Usama bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri found refuge with Omar al-
Bashir’s Muslim Brotherhood regime in the early 1990s and others (including Belhadj)
eventually fled back to Afghanistan, where both bin-Laden and al-Zawahiri also had
relocated by the mid-1990s. Abu Anas al-Libi is alleged to have taken part in the preattack
casing and surveillance of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya a few years prior to
the 1998 al-Qa’eda attack there.
By 1995, things were becoming hot for the jihadis in Sudan and while bin Laden and al-
Zawahiri returned to Afghanistan about this time, others such as Anas al-Libi were
offered safehaven by the British. In return for political asylum in the UK, MI 6 recruited
Anas al-Libi’s support for a failed 1996 plot to assassinate Qaddafi. In all, Anas al-Libi
lived in Manchester from 1995-2000—despite his known history of association with bin
Laden, al-Zawahiri, and other AQ leaders, as well as willingness to participate in
assassination plots against national leaders, as I wrote in an October 2013 piece at The
Clarion Project. The U.S.’s British partners also provided asylum to Abu Abdullah As-
Sadeq, the LIFG’s top commander and allowed the LIFG to publish an Arabic language
newspaper called al-Wasat in London. By 2000, though, as the FBI and other Western
security services began to close in, Anas al-Libi and others were on the move again,
leaving behind a 180-page al-Qa’eda terror training manual that became known as the
“Manchester Document.” In the run-up to the 11 September 2001 attacks, Anas al-Libi,
Abdelhakim Belhadj, Abu Sufian bin Qumu, and other known LIFG members
reconnected with bin Laden in Afghanistan. As John Rosenthal points out in a 10 October
2013 posting, “The Inevitable Rise of Al-Qaeda in Libya,” in the immediate aftermath of
9/11, “the history of close cooperation between the LIFG and al-Qa’eda was so extensive
that the Libyan group figured among the very first organizations to be designated as al-
Qaeda affiliates by the UN Security Council.” In fact, according to Rosenthal who cites
former LIFG member, Norman Benotman, Belhadj was actually present with bin Laden
at Tora Bora in December 2001. The LIFG was formally accepted as an al-Qa’eda
franchise by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the AQ deputy at the time, in 2007.
In the years following 9/11, various LIFG members were detained: Abu Sufian bin Qumu
was captured in 2002 and sent to Guantanamo Bay (GITMO) and in 2004, both Abu
Anas al-Libi and Abdelhakim Belhadj were captured. By the mid-2000s, GITMO
detainees were being released to their home countries. Abu Sufian bin Qumu, for
example, was released from GITMO and returned to Libya in 2007. Beginning about
2005, Qaddafi was under pressure from both the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli and his own
son, Seif, to begin what came to be known as “the reconciliation process,” in which LIFG
and other jihadist prisoners were released from Libyan jails. In this process, LIFG
Muslim Brotherhood cleric Ali Mohammad Al-Sallabi was a key mediator. Abdelhakim
Belhadj was released in 2008 (just as Christopher Stevens was appointed Deputy Chief of
12
Mission to Tripoli) and Abu Sufian bin Qumu in 2010, after which he returned to Derna
to begin plotting the revolt against Qaddafi.
Even as this “reconciliation process” was underway and Christopher Stevens was
preparing for his new posting, Libyan jihadis were flowing out of eastern Libya in droves
to join the al-Qa’eda jihad against U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. According to a June
2010 study compiled by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, “Al-Qa’ida’s
Foreign Fighters in Iraq,” coalition forces in Iraq captured a stash of documents in
October 2007 which documented the origins of the foreign fighters who’d traveled to Iraq
to join al-Qa’eda between August 2006 and August 2007. Termed the “Sinjar Records”
after the nearest town where these personnel records were found, the data showed that by
far the largest contingent of foreign fighters per capita came from Libya. Across the
spectrum, the most common cities of origin for foreign fighters in Iraq were Darnah,
Libya and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Darnah is located in the eastern Cyrenaica region of
Libya, long known as an incubator of jihadist ideology and the place which would
become the cradle of the 2011 Islamic uprising against Muammar Qaddafi.
Nor was the new Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) Christopher Stevens unaware of what
was going on. A June 2008 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli that went out over
Stevens’ signature was obtained by the London Telegraph from Wikileaks. The report
was given the name “Die Hard in Derna,” after the Bruce Willis movie, and described the
determination of the young jihadis of this eastern Libyan town to bring down the Qaddafi
regime. Because they believed the U.S. government supported the Qaddafi regime and
would not allow it to fall after it had abandoned its Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) programs and begun to provide counter-terrorism support, and as documented in
the West Point study of the “Sinjar Records,” the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
instead sent its fighters to confront the U.S. in Iraq, believing that was a way to strike a
blow against both Qaddafi and his U.S. backers. A local Derna resident told the visiting
Embassy officer that Libyan fighters who had returned from earlier battlefields in
Afghanistan (1980s) and elsewhere sometimes went on for additional “religious training”
in Lebanon and Syria; when they eventually returned to Libya in the late 1980s and early
1990s, they began the process of preparing the ground for “the eventual overthrow by the
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) of Muammar Qadhafi’s regime…”
Career Foreign Service Officer Christopher Stevens was first posted to the American
Embassy in Tripoli, Libya in June 2007 as the DCM and later as charge d’affaires until
2009. For his second tour in Libya, Stevens was sent to rebel headquarters in Benghazi,
Libya, to serve as special representative to the Libyan Transitional National Council. He
arrived on a Greek cargo ship on April 5, 2011 and stayed until November. His
mission was to forge stronger links with the Interim Transitional National Council, and
gain a better understanding of the various factions fighting the Qaddafi regime. His
13
reports back to Washington were said to have encouraged the U.S. to support and
recognize the rebel council, which the Obama administration did formally in July 2011.
As is now known, under urging from Sen. John McCain and other Congressional
members, the White House endorsed Qatar’s plan to send weapons to the Libyan rebels
shortly after Yousef al-Qaradawi, the senior jurist of the Muslim Brotherhood, issued a
21 February 2011 fatwa that called for the killing of Qaddafi. Seeking a “zero footprint,”
no-paperwork-trail profile itself, the U.S. instead encouraged both Qatar and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) to arm the Libyan jihadis, according to a key New York
Times article published in December 2012. Knowing full well exactly who those rebel
militias and their leadership were, and how closely they were connected with al-Qa’eda
(and perhaps even mindful of the legal restrictions on providing material support to
terrorism), the U.S. sought to distance itself as the source of these weapons, which
included small arms such as automatic rifles, machine guns, and ammunition. The NY
Times piece noted that U.S. officials made sure to stipulate the weapons provided would
come from elsewhere, but not from the U.S.
But the fact that from the end of March 2011 onward, U.S. and other NATO forces
completely controlled Libyan air space and the sea approaches to Libya means that the
cargo planes and freighters transporting the arms into Libya from Qatar and elsewhere
were being waved through with full U.S. knowledge and support. The U.S. mission in
Libya, and especially in Benghazi, ramped up in this period to facilitate the delivery of
the weapons to the Libyan al-Qa’eda terrorists.
What followed should hardly have come as a surprise to anyone. After NATO air support
cleared the way to Tripoli, the Qaddafi regime fell in October 2011 and the Muslim
Brotherhood political leadership and al-Qa’eda fighters took over. Abdelhakim Belhadj
was named Tripoli military commander. Chaos reigned, especially in the eastern regions,
and now the weapons flow reversed—out of Libya, and into the hands of jihadis in West
Africa, the Sinai, and Syria. Some of that flow was wildly disorganized and some of it
was directed, with the U.S. mission in Benghazi once again playing a key role as its
teams on the ground facilitated the weapons delivery, now destined for the Syrian rebels,
dominated by al-Qa’eda and the Muslim Brotherhood, who were fighting to overthrow
the Bashar al-Assad regime. In this endeavor, the U.S. was allied with its new Libyan
partner, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and once again, with Qatar.
The next chapter in the U.S. jihad wars was underway, with a new Presidential Finding,
and material support to terrorism firmly established as official policy. Congress and the
media and the military remained silent. The American people barely noticed.
14
Benghazi and the Politicization of Intelligence
Clare Lopez — March 11, 2014
http://www.aim.org/aim-column/benghazi-and-the-politicization-of-intelligence/
As we now know, within about 15 minutes after the start of the attack on the U.S. Special
Mission Compound (SMC) in Benghazi on 11 September 2012, top U.S. civilian and
uniformed officials were informed that it was a terrorist attack. The information was
clear, unambiguous, and remained consistent over the chaotic hours that followed. It did
not change. If anything, the exceptionally accurate final mortar strike on the CIA Annex
that took the lives of former Navy SEALs Glenn Doherty and Ty Woods, and gravely
injured others, provided conclusive evidence of a carefully pre-planned attack. There is
simply no room for equivocation on this: it was a well-organized, military-style assault
by terrorists armed with assault rifles, RPGs, and eventually a mortar.
Mike Morell, then-head of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC), had the task of
helping to prepare talking points for then-U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice, who
was slated to appear on five Sunday morning talk shows a few days later. Morell was
personally responsible for “cutting some 50 percent of the text,” including all “references
to Al Qaeda” and the many earlier terror attacks against U.S. and other Western targets in
Benghazi. When the Senate Intelligence Committee finally succeeded in prying loose the
emails that had flowed back and forth to the CIA, State Department and the White House
during the talking points editing process, it was clear that Morell not only had
misrepresented his own role, but also had been less than forthcoming about the close
oversight role played by the White House in ensuring that all references to al-Qa’eda
15
terrorism would be scrubbed. Morell also made sure to scrub from the talking points the
honest assessment that “We cannot rule out that individuals had previously surveilled the
U.S. facilities, also contributing to the efficacy of the attacks.”
With the President in a close re-election race and touting the obviously inaccurate meme
that al-Qa’eda was on the run and close to defeat, it wouldn’t have helped to admit that
Islamic terrorists, after what was likely weeks of planning and rehearsal, had just overrun
a U.S. diplomatic post in North Africa and killed four Americans. Better to obfuscate
until the election was safely behind them. Besides, “What difference does it make?” that
the most senior officials of the U.S. government deliberately subverted the intelligence
process as long as it helped ensure the President’s re-election?
Nearly as troubling as Morell’s misleading congressional testimony was the
overwhelming silence from senior Defense Department officials, who also knew full well
that Susan Rice’s talk-show narrative was false—and yet remained silent. Republican
chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Mike Rogers (MI) indicated on 27
February 2014 that Morell likely will be called back to clarify his testimony.
There is no doubt that top officials at the Defense Department knew almost immediately
that the Benghazi attack was a terrorist attack—and given the stream of reporting about
al-Qa’eda’s increasingly aggressive behavior during the months leading up to the 11
September 2012 final attack, also should have had few doubts about who was
responsible. According to closed door classified testimony on 26 June 2013 before the
House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, AFRICOM
commander Gen. Carter Ham (who happened to be in the Pentagon that night)
immediately told Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) Gen. Martin Dempsey about the attack, saying that it was unambiguously a
terrorist attack. The two of them—Panetta, and Dempsey—then departed from the
Pentagon together for a previously-scheduled meeting with President Obama at the White
House.
Even as these Defense officials were briefing the President on what was happening in
Benghazi, telling him that the U.S. Ambassador to Tripoli, Christopher Stevens, was
missing, the same information about the attack was reaching the Pentagon and key
combatant commands, all of which were told the same thing: it was a terrorist attack.
Later that night, Greg Hicks, the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in Tripoli, spoke by
phone with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other top State Department advisors,
telling them that he feared Ambassador Stevens might be in the clutches of terrorists at a
Benghazi hospital and that he was concerned about the possibility of a terrorist attack on
the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli as well. He soon learned from the Libyan prime minister that
Stevens was dead, and relayed that information to the State Department at around 9 p.m.
Washington time. But there was still nothing about a video. Nothing at all.
Then came the 10 p.m. phone call from the President to Secretary of State Clinton—the
person that almost no one (except Andrew McCarthy here) mentions. This was the 10
p.m. phone call that White House spokesman Jay Carney reluctantly mentioned on 20
16
February 2013 in response to questions from the press corps. According to CNS News,
the President called Clinton “to get an update on the situation.” It was right afterward that
Clinton released a statement linking the attacks to “inflammatory material posted on the
Internet,” a reference to “The Innocence of Muslims” YouTube film trailer. As it turned
out, that deliberately duplicitous initial reference to a video that had nothing to do with
the attack on the Benghazi SMC presaged a full two weeks of false statements from
President Obama, Secretary Clinton, White House spokesman Jay Carney, and others
about the film clip.
Neither Morell, nor any other top Obama administration official, has any excuse for not
knowing the attack was a terrorist attack, or for thinking somehow that a demonstration
or protests had preceded it. According to FOX News journalist Catherine Herridge, a
report from the CIA’s own senior officer on the ground in Tripoli, Libya confirmed in a
15 September 2012 email that the attack was “not/not an escalation of protests,” but
rather a coordinated terror attack. That email was received by Morell, CIA Director
David Petraeus, and other senior CIA officials a full day before Susan Rice was sent out
to broadcast false information to the American people on the 16 September Sunday talk
shows.
But Morell still wasn’t coming clean on everything. In November 2012, Morell was once
again before the House Intelligence Committee, along with Director of National
Intelligence, James Clapper, and CTC Chief Matt Olsen. When asked who had been
responsible for the talking points, Clapper said that he had no idea, while Morell
remained silent. In another meeting that took place in late 2012, Morell again seemed to
have trouble telling the truth. He and Rice met with Senators Kelly Ayotte (R-NH), John
McCain (R-AZ), and Lindsey Graham (R-SC). Under questioning from the senators
about the talking-points editing process, Morell tried to blame the FBI for cutting the
reference to al-Qa’eda terrorism; he said the FBI didn’t want to compromise an ongoing
criminal investigation. When Graham called the FBI and told them what Morell had said,
“they went ballistic,” Graham said in an interview with Fox News. Confronted with this,
Morell changed his statement and admitted that he, and the CIA, had been responsible
after all.
Confusion in the early hours, and even early days, following a chaotic situation such as
that which confronted U.S. leadership on 11 September 2012 would be understandable.
But it is the certain knowledge that our most senior civilian, intelligence, and military
officers deliberately and repeatedly lied, including before Congress, about what they
knew at the time to be a terrorist attack on our mission by al-Qa’eda jihadis that so
corrodes Americans’ trust in their leadership. This is particularly damaging because there
is the appearance of a coordinated cover-up staged to ensure the re-election of a President
who’d staked his campaign on the repeated assertion that al-Qa’eda had been
“decimated,” or was on “the path to defeat.”
In July 2013, Mike Morell joined the consulting firm of Beacon Global Strategies LLC,
which had been founded not long beforehand by four others with close ties to former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: Michael Allen, Jeremy Bash, Philippe Reines, and
17
Andrew Shapiro (who was the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs
from 2009-2013, with responsibility for security relationships with U.S. Middle East
partners).
Clare M. Lopez is Vice President for Research and Analysis at the Center for Security
Policy and a Senior Fellow at the London Center for Policy Research. She is also a
member of the Citizens’ Commission on Benghazi.
18
Obama and His Media Loyalists Still Spinning Benghazi
Roger Aronoff — February 6, 2014
http://www.aim.org/aim-column/obama-and-his-media-loyalists-still-spinning-benghazi/
The media and Obama administration are at it again, trying to defend their
earlier actions on Benghazi. For weeks following the September 11, 2012 attacks,
President Obama and his colleagues blamed them on a spontaneous
demonstration inspired by protests in Cairo, a position that has been repeatedly
found to be patently untrue.
But Obama would prefer that the American public ignore this and his other
“phony” scandals. In fact, he told Bill O’Reilly in a recent pre-Super Bowl
interview that scandals like the IRS controversy are the result of irresponsible
reporting by Fox News. “These kinds of things keep on surfacing in part because
you and your TV station will promote them,” he told O’Reilly.
In an effort to convince us that Benghazi is not a scandal, Obama, arguing with
O’Reilly, once again attempted to defend his completely indefensible narrative
that in fact he said from day one that it was a terrorist attack (or in his words, “an
act of terror”), and that the decision to claim the attack was the result of a
spontaneous demonstration, sparked by an anti-Islam video, was made with the
best information available.
As Accuracy in Media has reported, General Carter Ham, head of AFRICOM, told
19
then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta on the night of the attacks that there was
a terrorist attack, not a spontaneous demonstration, in Benghazi. When asked
about that, Obama maintained that Secretary Panetta told him that evening that
it was just a plain “attack.”
O’Reilly pressed the point. “Understand, by definition, Bill, when somebody is
attacking our compound, that’s an act of terror, which is how I characterized it
the day after it happened,” responded President Obama. “So, the question ends
up being, who in fact was attacking us?”
It turns out, according to a recently released Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence report, that the attackers were a mix of low-level terrorists:
“Individuals affiliated with terrorist groups, including [Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb], Ansar al-Sharia, [Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula], and the
Mohammad Jamal Network, participated in the September 11, 2012 attacks,”
states the report. Ansar al Sharia was recently designated a foreign terrorist
organization by the administration.
But Obama still characterizes the attack differently. “What happens is you have
an attack like this taking place, and you have a mix of folks who just are
troublemakers, you have folks who have an ideological agenda, you have some
who are affiliated with terrorist organizations, you have some that are not,” he
said.
Indeed, the SSCI report classifies the attack as “not a highly coordinated plot,
but…opportunistic.”
However, to claim that that they couldn’t classify it as a terrorist attack at the
time is disingenuous. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) recently revealed that the
FBI interviewed witnesses to the attacks on September 15, 16, and 17, and “not
one person ever mentioned anything other than a terrorist attack. No one
mentioned a protest outside the consulate.” Sen. Graham is backed up by the
findings of the bipartisan “Flashing Red” report of December 2012. Yet the myth
of a spontaneous protest in Benghazi lives on.
And the debate could be seen on MSNBC, when in a post-State of the Union
segment that included an interview with Representative Tim Huelskamp (R-KS),
Rachel Maddow was left babbling, seemingly trying to turn the debate into a
“War on Women” issue by suggesting that the congressman was being sexist in
calling her a cheerleader. Maddow had just finished asking the congressman
whether he had voted for bills that slashed funding for diplomatic posts in
response to his outrage about Benghazi.
But that is a phony issue, and Maddow must know that. State Department official
Charlene Lamb had testified before the House that funding had nothing to do
with the decisions surrounding Benghazi’s ongoing poor security.
20
Maddow: “Did you just call me a cheerleader?”
Rep. Huelskamp: “I don’t know, maybe you have that history. I’m saying—”
Maddow: “No, wait, wait. Hold on. Hold on.”
Rep. Huelskamp: “When you’re a cheerleader for the administration, you’re
not being a journalist. When you’re not willing to look at the facts. If it was Bush,
you would be jumping and screaming.”
Maddow: “You’re amazing.”
Rep. Huelskamp made it clear that he was calling Maddow a cheerleader for the
Obama administration. And, given her history, who could deny that?
Then Mr. Thrill-up-his-leg Chris Matthews jumped in to claim that the SSCI
report was a vindication of President Obama’s and Susan Rice’s position on
Benghazi.
Clearly, Matthews either doesn’t know what’s in the report, or he’s just doing his
usual defend-Obama-at-all-costs routine. “And also, by the way, the nonpartisan—
or bipartisan, Senate Intelligence Committee has completely verified
everything that Susan Rice said, every point,” contended Matthews. “[The attack]
was caused by a copycat attack coming from Cairo over to Benghazi, which was
itself stimulated by all the evidence they have by that crazy movie guy making a
movie out in Los Angeles,” he continued. “And the fact that the use of the term
extremist rather than terrorist came from the CIA, and the non-reference to the al
Qaeda was a decision by the sainted General Petraeus at the CIA. Everything was
done right.”
But wait. Didn’t President Obama call it an “act of terror” from day one? If he
knew it was a terrorist act, and not a spontaneous demonstration, why did Susan
Rice, speaking on his behalf, say otherwise?
“Some intelligence suggests the attacks were likely put together in short order,
following that day’s violent protests in Cairo against an inflammatory video,
suggesting that these and other terrorist groups could conduct similar attacks
with little advance warning,” states the report. This has been used by some to say
that the spontaneous demonstration narrative is true.
However, the report does not call the attack a “copycat” attack, as Matthews does.
In fact, the report says that “intelligence analysts inaccurately referred to the
presence of a protest at the [Benghazi] Mission facility…” and didn’t rely enough
on eyewitness statements in their data collection.
21
As stated before, the eyewitnesses called it a terrorist attack in their interviews
with the FBI. Former Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya Gregory Hicks
characterized the YouTube video as a “non-event in Libya” in his testimony
before the House.
Clearly, some controversy remains over these points, and the difference in
opinion appears to be between those sitting in their offices that night in the
nation’s capital, who tried to spin the least harmful narrative two months before a
presidential election, and those on the ground in Libya at the time. To suggest
that Obama and Rice did everything right, and that they did not mislead the
public, is also disingenuous on Matthews’ part.
Roger Aronoff is the Editor of Accuracy in Media, and can be contacted at
roger.aronoff@aim.org.
22
New York Times Attempts to Blur Benghazi Scandal
Roger Aronoff and Bethany Stotts — December 31, 2013
http://www.aim.org/aim-column/new-york-times-attempts-to-blur-benghazi-scandal/
The New York Times’ latest piece on Benghazi is a farce, and some media
outlets are calling the paper on this agenda-driven reporting. The piece, by Times
reporter David Kirkpatrick, argues that the attacks on the Special Mission
Compound and CIA Annex last year were in reaction to a YouTube video, and
that there was no involvement by al Qaeda. If the Times thought this article
would be the final word, they were badly mistaken. The effect has been to bring
Benghazi back front and center, where it is getting new, badly needed scrutiny.
Accuracy in Media has, time and again, disproven these points. But, given, the
misinformation put forward by the Gray Lady, the facts bear repeating:
“Months of investigation by The New York Times, centered on extensive
interviews with Libyans in Benghazi who had direct knowledge of the attack there
and its context, turned up no evidence that Al Qaeda or other international
terrorist groups had any role in the assault,” reported The New York
Times (emphasis added). “The attack was led, instead, by fighters who had
benefited directly from NATO’s extensive air power and logistics support during
the uprising against Colonel Qaddafi.”
“I think, honestly, if you asked anyone in the U.S. intelligence business, they
would tell you the same thing,” said Kirkpatrick on NBC’s Meet the Press.
“There’s just no chance that this was an al-Qaeda attack, if, by al Qaeda you mean
the organization founded by Osama bin Laden.”
23
AIM asked James Woolsey, former CIA director under President Clinton, about al
Qaeda in a different context, for the documentary “Confronting Iraq.” “Al-Qaeda
is both an organization and, in a sense, an ideology,” he told us. In either sense of
the term used for “al Qaeda,” they were definitely involved in Benghazi.
But even if The New York Times were correct in its two main assertions, that
would not exonerate President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton for the administration’s repeated decisions not to increase security at the
Special Mission Compound despite the deteriorating situation in Benghazi. Nor
would it address what is perhaps the biggest part of the scandal, the failure to
send available forces to attempt to save the people under attack. That was what
motivated many high-ranking military and CIA officers to come together to form
the Citizens’ Commission on Benghazi, and it has never been satisfactorily
explained.
Matthew Vadum, writing for Front Page Magazine, outlines this blurring of the
lines on Benghazi for just what it is: a shameless attempt to find “wiggle room”
for Hillary Clinton’s political career. Vadum argues that the “New York Times is
attempting to rewrite the narrative about what really happened in Benghazi and
afterwards.” He writes, “It is trying to resurrect the Obama administration’s
original line of argument in order to create wiggle room for Hillary Clinton who
has been scathingly criticized by Republican lawmakers and the occasional
Democrat for bungling the Benghazi saga.”
The Times’ editorial page editor, Andrew Rosenthal, pushed back against charges
that the Times’ was providing political cover for Mrs. Clinton and President
Obama:
For anyone wondering why it’s so important to Republicans that Al Qaeda
orchestrated the attack—or how the Obama administration described the attack
in its immediate aftermath—the answer is simple. The Republicans hope to
tarnish Democratic candidates by making it seem as though Mr. Obama doesn’t
take Al Qaeda seriously. They also want to throw mud at former Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton, who they fear will run for president in 2016.
Charles Krauthammer, on Fox News’ Special Report, responded to Rosenthal’s
defense of Kirkpatrick’s piece, saying, “Well, I think he gave the game away. By
being defensive about this, he’s making it quite obvious the reason that the Times
invested all the effort and time in this, and put on the front page precisely a way
to protect the Democrats, to deflect the issue, to protect Hillary, who is exposed
on this issue as almost no issue in her tenure in the administration. It is obviously
a political move.”
The Times piece virtually ignores the security situation in Benghazi at the time,
instead focusing partly on a video and its supposed impact on the attacks. As
mentioned above, Kirkpatrick believes that local militias who defeated Gaddafi
24
are responsible for the attack, not al Qaeda. “Some analysts argue that the White
House, meanwhile, sought to play down any potential characterization of the
assault as a Qaeda attack, because that would undercut its claims to have crushed
Al Qaeda,” wrote Kirkpatrick very ironically in October of 2012 for the Gray Lady.
Is he serving that White House purpose now?
Even Democratic Congressman Adam Schiff (CA) said that “the intelligence
indicates that al-Qaeda was involved, but there were also plenty of people and
militias that were unaffiliated with al-Qaeda that were involved.” As for the Times
report, it may “add some insights, but I don’t think it’s complete,” he said.
The article even contradicts comments from Hillary Clinton, as reported in The
New York Times on September 26th, 2012, while the Obama administration was
still trying to get its story straight:
‘Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has long operated in the region,’ she [Sec.
Clinton] said, and was now exploiting a haven in Mali to export extremism and
terrorist violence to neighbors like Libya.
‘Now with a larger safe haven and increased freedom to maneuver, terrorists are
seeking to extend their reach and their networks in multiple directions,’ Mrs.
Clinton told leaders assembled at the meeting, including President François
Hollande of France and the United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-moon. ‘And
they are working with other violent extremists to undermine the democratic
transitions under way in North Africa, as we tragically saw in Benghazi’
(emphasis added).
Fox News’ Adam Housley was able to elicit statements from his sources about
The New York Times’ reporting, one of which was, “To say that it wasn’t tied to Al
Qaeda is completely false. There is literal evidence in many forms and shapes,
directly linking him [Ahmad Abu Khattalah].”
Other intelligence links al Qaeda to the attacks, including the CIA and FBI
internal emails at the time. In an email sent on September 14, 2012 from the CIA,
a staffer wrote “Thanks… Fyi FBI says AQ (not AQIM) was involved and they are
pushing that theory.”
The New York Times uses Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM’s) lack of
stated involvement in a letter found in Mali by the Associated Press as further
proof that al Qaeda was not involved in the attacks, when the email cited above
demonstrates that intelligence sources were analyzing core al Qaeda involvement
days after the attacks occurred.
Fox News correspondent Catherine Herridge points out that her news
organization revealed that “A former Guantanamo detainee, Sufian bin Qumu,
who is suspected of training some of the operatives who took part in the assault,
25
was in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, according to a knowledgeable source.”
“Fox News was told last fall that the intelligence community was trying to
determine whether he played any role directing the attack and whether he was
physically on or near the consulate grounds.”
Of Qumu, the Times says: “But neither Mr. Qumu nor anyone else in Derna
appears to have played a significant role in the attack on the American Mission,
officials briefed on the investigation and the intelligence said.”
So, contradictions still endure in this case, but we are supposed to take the Times’
unnamed official source as the gospel truth.
As for Ansar al Sharia, The New York Times actually quotes from a militia leader
who likened it to the Boy Scouts, and also talks about all the charitable things
that Ansar al Sharia does: “Ansar al-Shariah focused on charitable missionary
work, including an antidrug campaign with local corporate sponsors, picking up
garbage during sanitation strikes and offering exorcisms for those troubled by
evil spirits.” Al Nusrah does charitable deeds in Syria; that doesn’t absolve it from
its position as an al Qaeda-linked terrorist group.
Ansar al Sharia is connected to al Qaeda, and has been connected since before the
attacks. As pointed out in a recent AIM column, an August
2012 government counterterrorism report stated that “Ansar al-Sharia
(Supporters of Sharia), a militia group led by Sufian Ben Qhumu, a former
Guantanamo Bay detainee, could be the new face of al-Qaeda in Libya despite its
leader’s denial” (emphasis added).
“In a different direction, Ansar al-Sharia may become the new brand name under
which jihadist groups in the Arab world seek to organize,” the report stated.
These are not words describing a locally oriented group.
“But the Republican arguments appear to conflate purely local extremist
organizations like Ansar al-Shariah with Al Qaeda’s international terrorist
network,” reported Kirkpatrick in his controversial Times’ piece.
It wasn’t Republicans who wrote the August 2012 Library of Congress report
we’ve cited.
As for the spontaneity of the attack, Kirkpatrick writes that “The attack does not
appear to have been meticulously planned, but neither was it spontaneous or
without warning signs.”
“The violence, though, also had spontaneous elements.”
26
Let’s put aside, for a moment, that Representative Mike Rogers (R-MI),
Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, has said that he thought the
operational phase of the attack lasted at least a couple of weeks. Libyan National
Congress President Mohamed Yousef El-Magariaf estimated that they had been
planning it for months when he appeared on CBS’s Face the Nation on September
16, 2012. The Times mentions Susan Rice’s talk show appearances, but not
Magariaf’s Face the Nation appearance—which took place immediately before
Rice’s.
The idea that the attacks were the result of the video—which the Times argues—is
pure “baloney,” according to Aaron Klein writing for WorldNetDaily. After all, “A
review of more than 4,000 postings was conducted by the leading social media
monitoring firm Agincourt Solutions, reportedly finding the first reference to the
film was not detected on social media until the day after the attack,” reports
Klein. Former Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya Gregory Hicks, testifying before
Congress, characterized the video as a “non-event” in Libya at the time.
“It was a coordinated attack. It is completely false to say anything else. … It is
completely a lie,” one witness tells Fox News.
“For this individual [Kirkpatrick] to insult the intelligence of the American people
is offensive,” asserted former Congressman Allen West in a recent editorial. “To
them, if some jihadist does not walk up, give them a business card, and say, ‘Hi,
I’m from al-Qaeda and I’m here to kill you,’ then the threat isn’t real and can be
pushed aside.” West is a member of Accuracy in Media’s Citizens’ Commission on
Benghazi.
Roger Aronoff is the Editor of Accuracy in Media, and can be contacted at
roger.aronoff@aim.org. Bethany Stotts is a freelance writer, and former staff
writer for Accuracy in Academia. She blogs at
http://bethanystotts.wordpress.com/.
27
“There is, however, a limit at which forbearance ceases to be a virtue.”
~ Edmund Burke
The Honorable John Boehner
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives
The Capitol, H-232
Washington, D.C., 20515
March 5, 2014
Dear Speaker Boehner,
Through the investigative journalism of Fox News reporter Catherine Herridge, a report
of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and the investigation and litigation efforts of Judicial
Watch, we now know that there is compelling evidence that former Acting Central Intelligence
Director Michael Morell has made false and misleading statements to Congress. This issue
demands your immediate personal attention.
We were pleased to see that our letter of January 6, 2014 may have persuaded you and
your various committee chairs investigating the Benghazi attacks to make some limited efforts to
promote information gathered through the uncoordinated work of the House.
But the establishment of the Internet website, “The House Republican Investigation of
Benghazi” only highlights the inadequacies of House efforts to date. Most Americans, in
addition to a large majority of your party’s caucus, demand a full and complete investigation of
this terror attack. Mr. Morell’s statements and conduct appear to have materially contributed to
confusing and misleading the Congress and the American people. Susan Rice’s latest rounds of
lies about Benghazi on the February 23, 2014 edition of Meet the Press illustrate the contempt
that this Administration has for your committees’ investigation to date.
Americans want facts and justice – not controlled leaks of heavily redacted interview
transcripts. The latest polling shows, “Sixty-six percent of voters want Congress to keep
investigating the White House’s handling of Benghazi. That includes 50 percent of Democrats,
68 percent of Independents and 83 percent of Republicans.”
Once again, we urge you to now create a House Select Investigative Committee on
Benghazi – fully resourced with staff and subpoena powers – to conduct a thorough, coordinated
investigation.
Mr. Morell must be compelled to appear before Congress and explain his statements and
conduct. Even if he invokes his right not to testify under the Fifth Amendment, then the
Congress must pursue, through a Select Committee, the many unanswered questions and apparent
Obama administration cover-up of the terror attacks that cost the lives of Ambassador J.
Christopher Stevens, Foreign Service Officer Sean Smith, and Security Officers Glen Doherty
and Ty Woods.
In addition to these new concerns about potentially false and misleading testimony and
information being provided to Congress, there are a host of other Benghazi-related questions that
remain unanswered. Most troubling perhaps are the still unresolved questions about whether any
Obama Administration officials prevented available military assets, especially in the African
28
Command (AFRICOM), from being used to protect and secure American personnel and facilities
under attack in Benghazi. Indeed, Judicial Watch recently obtained new documents, first
uncovered by a retired military officer, that dramatically highlight significant U.S. Navy assets
that could have been deployed to assist and protect U.S. lives on September 11, 2012.
Gravely disturbing evidence of possible criminality and abuse of both public office and
the public trust is now before you. Mr. Speaker, you must act now.
Sincerely,
The Undersigned
29
“History of the Muslim Brotherhood Penetration of the U.S. Government”
Clare M. Lopez
Gatestone Institute – April 15, 2013
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3672/muslim-brotherhood-us-government
As bad as these developments were, things became immeasurably worse for American
national security under the administration of Barack Obama. Whereas President Bush
and most of his administration insiders remained largely unaware that they had been
manipulated by the Muslim Brotherhood, Obama and his close advisors proactively
chose to reach out to the Brotherhood, its affiliates, and supporters for advice, training,
and even administration appointments.
….
Another senior affiliate, Rashad Hussain, is the Obama administration’s envoy to the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Hussain’s background is replete with
Muslim Brotherhood associations, including the American Muslim Council (founded by
al-Qa’eda and Muslim Brotherhood operative, Abdurahman Alamoudi); the IIIT (which
is on the Brotherhood’s own list of “our friends and the organizations of our friends”);
and the Muslim Students Association (MSA, the original Brotherhood front group in the
U.S.).[82] In his official capacity, Hussain is responsible for providing advice on
national security and Muslim outreach. He assisted in writing the President’s June 2009
Cairo speech, in which Obama announced a new approach to the Muslim world and
essentially declared war on his host, then-President Hosni Mubarak, by publicly
signaling his recognition of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. Hussain also acts as
point man for the Obama administration’s cooperation with the Istanbul Process, the
OIC effort to criminalize internationally any criticism of Islam. The current
administration’s weeks-long duplicity in the aftermath of the 11 September 2012 terror
attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi, Libya, when it repeatedly and mendaciously
claimed that an Internet video trailer sparked a protest there that got out of hand,
appears to have been carefully scripted not just with the OIC but Muslim Brotherhood
organizations in the U.S., as well.

+++

“I don’t hate to say I told you so … I told you so.”

“Benghazi Cover-Up Syria CIA Petraeus Hillary Obama STOP NATO Newsfeed”

+++

About this blogger:

http://chemtrailsaroundtheworld.wordpress.com/about/

+++

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5 Responses to “Benghazi Clare Lopez Chuck Kubic Hillary Petraeus CIA Libya AFRICOM Judicial Watch”

  1. blessedistruth Says:

    #Benghazi #ClareLopez #ChuckKubic #Hillary #Petraeus #CIA #Libya #AFRICOM #JudicialWatch

    Benghazi Clare Lopez Chuck Kubic Hillary Petraeus CIA Libya AFRICOM Judicial Watch

    https://blessedistruth.wordpress.com/2014/05/21/benghazi-clare-lopez-chuck-kubic-hillary-petraeus-cia-libya-africom-judicial-watch/

  2. blessedistruth Says:

    The Unofficial Dan Burisch Chronicles Part Two …
    rosettasister.wordpress.com/…/the-unofficial-dan-burisch-chronicles-part

    “Perhaps they will also take the blame if things go south.”

    +++

    rosettasister Says:
    February 11, 2011 at 12:58 pm

    Well, if Dan and Marcia are taking the credit.

    Perhaps they will also take the blame if things go south.

  3. blessedistruth Says:

    “FEET DRY OVER LIBYA”

    Survivors of the attack at the annex say that they heard over the radio net that night that U.S. military assets were, “feet dry over Libya,” which would refer to assets crossing from sea to land and hovering. The Pentagon denies this.

    http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/11/11/military-timeline-from-night-benghazi-attack-begs-more-questions/

    [May have been contractors — mercenaries — Majestic.]

  4. blessedistruth Says:

    “Maps depicting all assets that could have been dispatched to the Benghazi mission or the CIA annex facility on September 11th and 12th, 2012 …”

    [Absurd these requests ALL from AIM (Accuracy in Media). So AIM does oversight now?]

    [If you are a congressperson and made similar requests, you should have made them public.]

  5. blessedistruth Says:

    #Kolomoisky #референдум #Россия #Путин #Одесса #Мариуполь #Донецк

    According to residents, who assisted the wounded soldiers, soldiers shot for what they refused to shoot at civilians.

    По мнению жителей, которые оказывали помощь раненым солдатам, военнослужащих расстреляли за то, что те отказались стрелять в мирных людей.

    http://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane_i_mire/content/201405221637-x0sm.htm

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